摘要
在我国人口老龄化、居民健康保健意识增强和医疗保健服务需求不断增加的背景下,政府加快了社区居民医疗健康保障体系建设.在该体系中,居民作为最终需求者与政府和社区基层医疗机构之间形成了复杂的多元委托代理关系.本文从经济学角度出发,首先运用委托代理理论探讨社区居民医疗健康保障主体之间的委托代理关系;其次分析多元委托代理关系各主体之间的博弈行为;再次揭示社区居民健康保障体系建设中由于参与主体间信息不对称、监管不到位而产生的道德风险行为;最后从解决信息不对称问题和完善监督约束机制两个角度提出降低我国社区健康保障体系中道德风险的有效途径.
Abstract
In the context of an aging population and the increasing awareness of healthcare and demands for medical care services in our country,the government has accelerated the construction of the community residents'medical and healthcare system.Within this system,complex multi-agent relationships have developed among residents as the ultimate demanders,the government,and commu-nity primary healthcare institutions.From the perspective of economics,this study first uses the principal-agent theory to explore the principal-agenct relationship among the medical and healthcare subjects of community residents.Secondly,the game behavior among the subjects of the multi-principal-agent relationship is analyzed.Thirdly,it reveals the moral hazard behaviors caused by information asymmetry and inadequate supervision among participating subjects in constructing the community residents'medical and healthcare system.Finally,from the perspective of solving the problem of information asymmetry and improving the supervision and constraint mechanism,an effective way to reduce moral hazard in China's community medical and healthcare system is proposed.
NETL
NSTL
维普
万方数据