Game Analysis of Rent-seeking by Owners'Representatives and All the Parties'Collusion in the Infrastructure Projects
When studying corruption crimes caused by collusion in the infrastructure projects,most studies focus on the collusion among owners,constructors,and supervisors.However,in the actual implementation of capital construction projects,as owners'representatives dispatched by the owners to protect their interests,they will conspire with other responsible parties to damage the owners'interests due to rent-seeking behavior.In order to explore measures to avoid the loss of assets due to rent-seeking by owners'representatives and the collusion of all the parties,this study analyzes the relationship of all the parties involved in the capital con-struction project and the game behavior from the perspective of game theory,establishes the game model of rent-seeking by the owner's representatives and all the parties'collusion,proposes the prerequisites for rent-seeking by owners'representatives and collusion among all the parties.And through the theoretical analysis of the conditions of collusion parties,their game conditions are clarified.This paper puts forward suggestions from three aspects:system construction,strengthening punishment,and improving reasonable income,so as to improve the success rate of the owner's attacking the rent-seeking and collusion of the owner's representatives and reduce the collusion intention of all the parties.
NETL
NSTL
万方数据
维普
