Mixed Ownership Structure of Peer Firms and Investment Efficiency of Listed Enterprises
Mixed ownership economy is an important form of realizing the basic socialist eco-nomic system.Most existing studies discuss the consequences and value of mixed ownership structure from the perspective of mixed-ownership enterprises.However,there is no direct answer from theo-retical or empirical studies on how the introduction and diffusion of mixed ownership will affect other companies and even the overall operation of market economy.Starting from the competition relation-ship between enterprises,this paper empirically tests the influence of the mixed ownership structure of competitors on the investment efficiency of listed enterprises.The main findings are as follows:the mixed ownership structure of competitors significantly improves the investment efficiency of listed en-terprises.Competition mechanism is the main mechanism of this influence.Heterogeneity analysis shows that this influence has no significant difference in state owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises.However,it is more significant when the competitive pressure of listed companies is greater,the chairman and the general manager are not in one and the analysts are more concerned.Further analysis shows the mixed ownership structure of competitors can improve the investment effi-ciency of enterprises by restraining over-investment and alleviating under-investment.In theory,this study provides evidence for the economic consequences of mixed ownership that differs from existing research.In practice,the findings of this study show that mixed ownership reform has certain exter-nalities,so it is necessary to coordinate both the capital market and the product market in the process of promoting and developing mixed ownership,and improve the quality of listed companies.
万方数据
