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不同驾驶风格车辆自由换道演化博弈机制

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为研究不同驾驶风格车辆换道与目标车道后车的决策演化博弈机理。提取苏州市快速路段车辆换道轨迹数据,通过K-means算法进行驾驶风格聚类。通过量化不同风格车辆收益参数和权重系数构建演化动态方程,根据雅可比矩阵的行列式和迹分析演化博弈均衡解的稳定性,利用数值仿真换道决策演化路径并对不同收益参数进行灵敏度分析。结果表明该演化博弈稳定策略组合为(换道,让行)和(不换道,不让行)。在相同初始状态时,激进型换道车与谨慎型后车交互时收敛于稳定策略速度最快。双方都是激进型时,随速度收益的增大促进稳定策略向(换道,让行)演化最为显著,随时间需求收益的增加抑制稳定策略向(换道,让行)演化最为显著。
Evolutionary Game Mechanism of Free Lane Changing for Vehicles with Different Driving Styles
To study the evolutionary game mechanism of lane changing and target lane following vehicles with differ-ent driving styles.Extract lane changing trajectory data of vehicles on fast road sections in Suzhou city,and cluster driv-ing styles using K-means algorithm.By quantifying the profit parameters and weight coefficients of vehicles with different styles,an evolutionary dynamic equation is constructed.The stability of the equilibrium solution of the evolutionary game is analyzed based on the determinant and trajectory of the Jacobian matrix.The evolution path of lane changing decisions is simulated numerically,and sensitivity analysis is performed on different profit parameters.The results indicate that the stable strategy combination of the evolutionary game is(changing lanes,giving way)and(not changing lanes,not giving way).When in the same initial state,the aggressive lane changing vehicle converges the fastest to a stable strategy when interacting with the cautious rear vehicle.The most significant inhibition of stable strategy evolution towards(lane chan-ging,yielding)is the increase in demand returns over time.

Urban transportationDriving styleFree lane changingEvolutionary game

王强、邓建华

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苏州科技大学,江苏苏州 215000

城市交通 驾驶风格 自由换道 演化博弈

2024

内燃机与配件
石家庄金刚内燃机零部件集团有限公司

内燃机与配件

影响因子:0.095
ISSN:1674-957X
年,卷(期):2024.(18)