Improper administrative intervention creates regional barriers and evokes rent-seeking problems,which is a major cause of factor market segmentation and resource misallocation,especially in the credit market.From the perspective of commer-cial banks choosing credit behavior,the panel data of 31 provinces in China from 2003 to 2019 are used to study the quality ef-fect of interest rate marketization on credit allocation under the market intervention of regional governments.The research shows that,under the condition of market intervention,commercial banks have a strong credit rent-seeking motivation,more inclined to meet the needs of regional governments rather than commercial orientation.The tightening of market discipline brought about by the market-oriented interest reform can promote commercial banks to enhance the commercial nature and significantly enhance the sensitivity of regional loan growth to profitability.However,it is unable to effectively inhibit their credit rent-seeking motiva-tions.As a result,the quality effect of interest rate marketization on credit allocation is difficult to exert.Better local government governance can effectively improve the quality effect of interest rate marketization reform on credit allocation.The study is con-ducive to a better definition of the key points for further marketization of interest rates required by high-quality development,and also provides empirical reference for the breakthrough of local administrative barriers and enhance local financial regulations for the purpose of constructing a unified market throughout the country.
关键词
利率市场化/信贷配置质量效应/信贷寻租/地方金融监管
Key words
interest rate marketization/quality effect on credit allocation/credit rent-seeking/local financial regulation
维普
万方数据