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共同机构投资者与管理者短视

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在理论分析共同机构投资者影响管理者短视行为内在机理的基础上,系统考察了二者之间的影响机制与边界条件.结果表明,共同机构投资者抑制了管理者短视,支持了协同治理假说.机制分析表明,共同机构投资者对管理者短视的抑制作用主要通过监督效应和协同效应实现.进一步地,在行业层面与企业层面的异质性检验表明,共同机构投资者对管理者短视的抑制作用在行业竞争优势与独立董事网络中心度较低情境下更为显著.
Common Institutional Investor and Managerial Myopia
Based on theoretical analysis of the underlying mechanism of common institutional investors'influence on manag-erial myopia,the influence mechanism and boundary conditions between the two are systematically examined.The results in-dicate that common institutional investors inhibit managerial myopia and support the synergistic governance hypothesis.The mechanism analysis shows that the inhibitory effect of common institutional investors on managerial myopia is mainly realized through the monitoring effect and synergistic effect.Further,industry-level and firm-level heterogeneity tests suggest that the inhibitory effect of common institutional investors on managerial myopia is more pronounced in the context of low industry competitive advantage and independent director network centrality.

common institutional investorsmanagerial myopiacollaborative governance hypothesisindustry competitionnetwork centrality of independent directors

王新光、盛宇华

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南京师范大学商学院,南京 210023

共同机构投资者 管理者短视 协同治理假说 行业竞争 独立董事网络中心度

国家哲学社会科学基金

20BGL139

2024

软科学
四川省科学技术促进发展研究中心

软科学

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:1.333
ISSN:1001-8409
年,卷(期):2024.38(1)
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