Using data from Chinese A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2020,this paper explores the relationship and mechanism among rent-seeking,high-pressure anti-corruption,and corporate innovation.Research has found that(1)rent-seeking at the enterprise level can promote innovation activities,but industry-level rent-seeking can inhibit innova-tion in the industry.(2)Renting can promote innovation through the"protection fee"function of protecting innovative a-chievements from plunder and the"lubricant"function of obtaining resources.(3)High-pressure anti-corruption can ef-fectively suppress the functions of rent-seeking as a"lubricant"and"protection fee",thereby eliminating the distorting effect of rent-seeking on innovation to a certain extent.(4)Compared to exploitative innovation,the distorting effect of rent-seeking on innovation and the corrective effect of high-pressure anti-corruption are more evident in exploratory in-novation activities.
NETL
NSTL
万方数据
