企业寻租、高压反腐与企业创新
Enterprise Rent Seeking,High-pressure Anti-corruption,and Enterprise Innovation
陈字理 1马文聪 2张光宇 2陈修德2
作者信息
- 1. 华南理工大学工商管理学院,广州 510630
- 2. 广东工业大学管理学院,广州 510520
- 折叠
摘要
利用2008-2020年中国A股上市企业数据,探讨企业寻租、高压反腐与企业创新三者之间的关系以及关系机制.研究发现:(1)企业层面的寻租能够促进创新活动的开展,但行业层面的寻租会抑制该行业的创新;(2)寻租能够通过保护创新成果免受掠夺的"保护费"功能与获得资源的"润滑剂"功能促进创新;(3)高压反腐能够有效抑制寻租"润滑剂"与"保护费"功能的发挥,从而一定程度上消除寻租对创新的扭曲效应;(4)相对利用式创新,寻租对创新的扭曲效应以及高压反腐的修正作用在探索式创新活动当中更加明显.
Abstract
Using data from Chinese A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2020,this paper explores the relationship and mechanism among rent-seeking,high-pressure anti-corruption,and corporate innovation.Research has found that(1)rent-seeking at the enterprise level can promote innovation activities,but industry-level rent-seeking can inhibit innova-tion in the industry.(2)Renting can promote innovation through the"protection fee"function of protecting innovative a-chievements from plunder and the"lubricant"function of obtaining resources.(3)High-pressure anti-corruption can ef-fectively suppress the functions of rent-seeking as a"lubricant"and"protection fee",thereby eliminating the distorting effect of rent-seeking on innovation to a certain extent.(4)Compared to exploitative innovation,the distorting effect of rent-seeking on innovation and the corrective effect of high-pressure anti-corruption are more evident in exploratory in-novation activities.
关键词
企业寻租/企业创新/高压反腐Key words
rent-seeking/enterprise innovation/high-pressure anti-corruption引用本文复制引用
基金项目
国家自然科学基金(71874036)
国家自然科学基金(72074056)
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据