管理者短视对企业绿色创新的影响研究——市场关注的调节作用
Impact of Managerial Myopia on Corporate Green Innovation:Moderating Role of Market Attention
余伟 1郭小艺1
作者信息
- 1. 南昌大学公共政策与管理学院,南昌 330031
- 折叠
摘要
以2008-2020年中国重污染行业A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了管理者内在短视特质与企业绿色创新的关系.结果表明,管理者短视抑制了企业的绿色创新.市场关注因素的调节效应分析发现:长期机构和分析师关注削弱了管理者短视对企业绿色创新的抑制作用.但从绿色创新类型来看,长期机构和分析师关注仅显著削弱了管理者短视对绿色实用新型的抑制作用,对管理者短视与绿色发明的关系无显著影响;普通投资者关注强化了管理者短视对绿色创新的抑制作用,且无论绿色发明还是实用新型创新,强化效应均显著存在.最终,管理者短视导致的绿色创新减少损害了企业未来的财务绩效.
Abstract
This paper takes A-share listed companies in China's heavily polluting industries from 2008 to 2020 as the re-search sample,and empirically tests the relationship between managerial myopia and corporate green innovation.The results show that managerial myopia inhibits corporate's green innovation.The moderating effect analysis of market attention finds that the attention of long-term institutions and analysts weaken the inhibitory effect of managerial myopia on corporate's green innovation.However,for types of green innovation,long-term institution and analyst attention only significantly weak-en the inhibitory effect of managerial myopia on corporate's green utility model innovations,but have no significant impact on the relationship between managerial myopia and corporate's green invention innovations.Ordinary investors attention strengthens the inhibitory effect of managerial myopia on corporate's green innovation,and no matter the green invention or the utility model innovations,the reinforcement effect is significant.Finally,managerial myopia damages the future financial performance of coporates by inhibiting green innovation.
关键词
管理者短视/绿色创新/市场关注/调节作用Key words
managerial myopia/green innovation/market attention/moderating role引用本文复制引用
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据