Four-dimensional Evolutionary Games of Project-based Horizontal R&D Cooperation Considering Dual Cooperative Value
This paper focuses on the interactive decision-making issues in project-based horizontal R&D collaborations,considering the dual economic and strategic values and their heterogeneous utilities.To address the co-evolution of cooper-ative and opportunistic behaviors among firms,a three-strategy four-dimensional evolutionary game model is constructed.The critical conditions and evolutionary mechanisms of cooperation and opportunism among enterprises are analyzed.It was found that:l)corporate R&D interest rate has a negative impact on the stable cooperation between the two parties and mod-erates the direction of the impact of R&D project cost and the input ratio between the two parties on the cooperation.2)In-creasing the overall economic or strategic increment of cooperation can promote the level of cooperation,but the allocation of the economic increment of cooperation among joint R&D enterprises can facilitate or hinder subsequent cooperation,the spe-cific direction of influence is moderated by a variety of value factors.3)Initial speculation can promote cooperation when the inter-organizational differences in economic and strategic value coefficients are considered such that the net benefit of speculation is greater than zero.Changes in the benefit and cost of speculation,the probability of being punished and its loss can affect the level of cooperation only when the critical condition of speculation is satisfied.
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