制造企业数字化转型决策两阶段复杂网络博弈仿真分析
Simulation Analysis of Two-stage Complex Network Game in Digital Transformation Decision of Manufacturing Enterprises
路世昌 1仪宣彤 1李丹 1魏夕凯2
作者信息
- 1. 辽宁工程技术大学工商管理学院,辽宁兴城 125100
- 2. 中国人民大学环境学院,北京 100000;中国船舶集团有限公司第七一四研究所,北京 100020
- 折叠
摘要
基于复杂网络博弈理论,依次构建制造企业、消费者群体间的两阶段数字化转型决策博弈模型,以小世界网络为载体,深入分析制造企业及消费者决策的内部微观决策影响因素及涌现的宏观扩散效果.结果表明:制造企业间联系程度越紧密,越有助于数字化转型决策扩散,随着网络规模的扩大,决策扩散效率减缓;制造企业的转型决策受到数据分析能力以及所获协同收益、金融收益的影响,对金融收益变化更加敏感;消费者数字消费决策受到自身的产品接受度、供给侧数字化转型企业比例的显著影响;政府行为有助于制造企业、消费者数字决策扩散,制造企业数字化转型行为对政府补助更加依赖,相较而言,消费者对补贴额度的边际变化敏感性较低.
Abstract
Based on complex network game theory,a two-stage digital transformation decision-making game model be-tween manufacturing enterprises and consumer groups is constructed,and the internal influencing factors of manufacturing enterprises'and consumers'decisions and the emergent macro-diffusion effects are analyzed with a small-world network.The results show that the closer the degree of connection between manufacturing enterprises,the more it helps digital trans-formation decision-making diffusion,and as the scale of the network expands,the decision diffusion efficiency slows down;manufacturing firms'transformation decisions are influenced by data analysis capabilities,synergy gains gained,and finan-cial gains,and are more sensitive to changes in financial gains;consumers'digital consumption decisions are significantly influenced by their product acceptance and the proportion of supply-side digitally transformed firms;government actions contribute to the diffusion of manufacturing firms'and consumers'digital decisions,and manufacturing firms'digital trans-formation behaviors are more sensitive to government subsidies more dependent,and consumers are less sensitive to marginal changes in the amount of subsidies by comparison.
关键词
数字化转型/制造企业/复杂网络/两阶段演化博弈Key words
digital transformation/manufacturing enterprises/complex network/two-stage evolutionary game引用本文复制引用
基金项目
辽宁省教育厅人文社会科学研究项目(21-A817)
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据