公共价值视域下垃圾焚烧发电PPP项目动态激励策略研究——基于公平偏好的演化博弈分析
Dynamic Incentive Strategy of Waste Incineration Power Generation PPP Project from the Perspective of Public Value:Evolutionary Game Analysis Based on Fairness Preference
王颖林 1陈乐棋 2郭思延2
作者信息
- 1. 厦门大学 公共事务学院,福建 厦门 361005;福建农林大学交通与土木工程学院,福州 350002
- 2. 福建农林大学交通与土木工程学院,福州 350002
- 折叠
摘要
将公共价值的实现作为政府设置激励机制的基础,基于政府部门与项目投资方的公平感知,构建了项目特许运营阶段双方的激励效用函数,通过演化博弈分析,研究了政府基于固定补贴及可变补贴的动态调节激励机制.结果表明:首先,投资方的生产能力、政府及投资方的公平偏好水平、项目的经济效益及激励机制的设定都会对公共价值的实现产生影响.其次,只有在特定的条件下,政府激励决策的设置和投资者努力策略选择与公平偏好程度之间才呈现出正向关联.最后,四种参数情境下补贴额度、公平偏好程度对政府与投资者的策略影响不同,为了保障激励机制执行的有效性,其设定也应有所差异.
Abstract
Taking the realization of public value as the basis of constructing the incentive mechanism of the government,based on the fair perception of the government departments and the project investors,the incentive utility function of both sides in the franchise operation stage is constructed.Through the evolutionary game analysis,the incentive mechanism of the government based on fixed subsidies and dynamic adjustment is studied.The results show that:firstly,the production capac-ity of the investor,the level of fairness preference of the government and investors,the economic benefits of the project,and the setting of incentive mechanisms will all have an impact on the realization of public value.Secondly,only under certain conditions can there be a positive correlation between the setting of government incentive decisions and the choice of inves-tors'effort strategies and the degree of fairness preference.Finally,under the four parameter scenarios,the amount of subsi-dy,the degree of fairness preference have different impacts on the strategies of the government and investors.To ensure the effectiveness of the implementation of the incentive mechanism,its settings should also be different.
关键词
垃圾焚烧发电PPP项目/公共价值/公平偏好/激励机制/演化博弈Key words
PPP project of waste incineration power generation/public value/fairness preference/incentive mechanism/evolutionary game引用本文复制引用
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据