竞争政策对企业劳动收入份额的影响机制研究
The Impact of Competition Policy on Firms' Labor Income Share
李旭东 1郑明波 2张森1
作者信息
- 1. 西安交通大学经济与金融学院,西安 710061
- 2. 长安大学经济与管理学院,西安 710064
- 折叠
摘要
基于2003-2022年A股上市公司数据,以《反垄断法》实施为准自然实验,运用双重差分模型考察竞争政策对企业劳动收入份额的影响效应及作用机制.结果发现,《反垄断法》对企业劳动收入份额具有显著正向影响.机制检验表明,《反垄断法》通过提高普通职工平均工资、扩大劳动雇佣规模和抑制有偏技术进步,进而提升企业劳动收入份额.异质性分析发现,《反垄断法》对于市场化程度较低地区、劳动资本密集型行业和国有企业的劳动收入份额的提升效应更为显著.
Abstract
Based on the data of A-share listed firms from 2003-2022,this paper uses the Antimonopoly Law as a quasi-natural experiment to evaluate the impact of competition policy on firms'labor income share.The study finds that the Antim-onopoly Law significantly raises the labor income share of firms.Mechanism tests show that the Antimonopoly Law raises la-bor income share by raising the average wage of general workers,expanding the scale of labor employment,and inhibiting biased technological progress.Heterogeneity analysis finds that the Antimonopoly Law has a more significant effect on the la-bor income share of less market-oriented regions,labor-capital-intensive industries,and state-owned enterprises.
关键词
竞争政策/反垄断/劳动收入份额/收入分配/共同富裕Key words
competition policy/antimonopoly/labor income share/income distribution/common wealth引用本文复制引用
基金项目
国家社会科学基金(21BJY004)
国家自然科学基金(72074176)
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据