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直播电商背景下品牌商、平台与主播的食品安全动态策略

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针对直播电商食品安全问题,建立直播电商背景下品牌商、平台与主播关于食品安全相关行为的三方随机微分博弈模型,利用博弈论、最优控制与随机分析理论在主播代播与商家自播模式下求解品牌商、平台与主播的均衡策略并进行比较分析.结果表明:在不同模式下以及消费者对直播带货的接受程度不同时,品牌商与平台决策变化小,而主播决策受到较大影响;品牌商选择自播模式有利于其长期发展,并且商家自播时提供的食品质量水平较高;在主播代播模式下,食品质量水平相对较低,并且随着消费者对直播带货接受程度的提高,品牌商和主播的利润会显著减少.据此,提出依据消费者对直播带货的不同接受程度进行合理利益分配等启示.
Food Safety Dynamic Strategies of Brands,Platforms,and Anchors in the Context of Live E-commerce
Aiming at the food safety issues of live e-commerce,this paper establishes a tripartite differential game model of food safety-related behaviors among brands,platforms,and anchors in the context of live e-commerce,uses game theo-ry,optimal control,and stochastic analysis theory to solve the equilibrium strategies of brands,platforms,and anchors un-der the mode of anchor and merchant self-broadcasting and make a comparative analysis.The results show that under dif-ferent modes and when consumers accept various levels of live streaming,the decision-making of brands and platforms changes little,while the anchors'decision-making is greatly affected;the choice of self-broadcasting mode by brand owners is conducive to their long-term development,and the food quality level provided by the self-broadcasting is rela-tively high;in the mode of anchoring on behalf of the anchor,the level of food quality is relatively low,and with the im-provement of consumers'acceptance of live broadcast delivery,the profits of brand owners and anchors will be significantly reduced.Based on this,some enlightenments are put forward,such as reasonable distribution of benefits based on the dif-ferent acceptance levels of consumers for live streaming.

food safetylive e-commercedifferential gamedynamic strategy

费威、王阔

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东北财经大学经济学院,辽宁大连 116025

食品安全 直播电商 微分博弈 动态策略

国家社会科学基金项目教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目辽宁省教育厅重点攻关项目东北财经大学"研究阐释党的二十大精神"校级项目

22AGL03321YJA790015JYTZD2023049DUFE2023E01

2024

软科学
四川省科学技术促进发展研究中心

软科学

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:1.333
ISSN:1001-8409
年,卷(期):2024.38(7)
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