Evolutionary Game Analysis of Blockchain Preventing Forestry Carbon Sink Project Development Risks
Taking the development of forestry carbon sink projects in shareholding cooperation mode as the research object,this paper focuses on the moral risks in the project development,constructs an evolutionary game model between farmers,enterprises,and government,and analyzes the mechanism of blockchain to solve the risks of the forestry carbon sink project development by comparing the changes of evolutionary stability strategies before and after the introduction of blockchain tech-nology.It finds that the revenue-sharing ratio works differently at different stages of evolution.When the system tends to default,the default cost of the project development enterprise and the revenue sharing ratio are the key to regulation,and the strengthening of regulation on farmers can only serve as a short-lived default constraint.When the system tends to a-bide by the contract,the distribution ratio of the proceeds and the supervision of the two sides are the keys to regulation,the government's supervision will have an impact on the distribution ratio of the proceeds,and the project development enterpri-ses have a high degree of sensitivity to the supervision,and a slight weakening of the supervision will make them decide to default.In the process of introducing the market mechanism,the lag of policy makes it difficult to maintain its regulatory strength in a reasonable range,and then it is impossible to form a long-term unique equilibrium and falls into the vicious circle of"compliance-default".The strict regulatory environment created by blockchain technology enables the coupling between market and government mechanisms.
forestry carbon sink project developmentblockchainmoral riskevolutionary game
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