人权2024,Issue(2) :148-164.

如何理解现代个体的人权——再思哈贝马斯的双重批判与主体间性重构

杨畅
人权2024,Issue(2) :148-164.

如何理解现代个体的人权——再思哈贝马斯的双重批判与主体间性重构

杨畅1
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作者信息

  • 1. 中南大学人文学院哲学系
  • 折叠

摘要

人权不仅是展现个体与共同体关系的要点,也是面向现实的政治哲学关注的焦点.人权与个体的自我认同密不可分,而自由主义与社群主义之争却揭示了,对个体的理解一直存在着实践性与历史性之间的矛盾.为了调和这种矛盾,哈贝马斯从德国古典哲学出发,分别对实践性和历史性作出了考察:费希特把对象性思维融贯在了自我认同中,他揭示出了个体的实践性,却忽略了个体的现实要素;黑格尔在同一性思维下阐释了自我认同,他从历史性维度考察了个体,却让理性法则统治了现实.最终,哈贝马斯通过批判主体性哲学的桎梏,从交往理论重构了现代个体自我认同的过程,他不仅调和了自我认同中实践性与历史性的分歧,也阐释了人权蕴含着的主体间性内核.

Abstract

Human rights are not only pivotal in depicting the relationship between individ-uals and communities but also a focal point of political philosophical concerns oriented towards reality.The inseparability of human rights from individual self-identity reveals a contradiction between practicality and historicity in understanding individuals,as highlighted in the debate between liberalism and communitarianism.In order to reconcile this contradiction,Habermas,drawing from German classical philosophy,examines practicality and historicity separately:while Fichte intertwines objectivity in self-identity,revealing the practicality of individuals but neglecting their real elements,Hegel interprets self-identity under the concept of unity,exami-ning individuals from a historical dimension but letting rational rules dominate reality.Ultimate-ly,Habermas reconstructs the process of modern individual self-identity from a communicative theory by critiquing the shackles of subjective philosophy.He not only reconciles the divergence between practicality and historicity in self-identity but also elucidates the intersubjective core in-herent in human rights.

关键词

人权/自我认同/实践性/历史性/主体间性

Key words

Human Rights/Self-Identity/Practicality/Historicity/Intersubjectivity

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基金项目

中央高校基本科研业务费专项中国人民大学科研项目(22XNA006)

出版年

2024
人权
中国人权研究会

人权

CSSCICHSSCD
ISSN:1009-6442
参考文献量52
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