首页|地方政府为何会推进举报式执法?

地方政府为何会推进举报式执法?

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举报式执法因其兼具工具价值和民主价值,被地方政府在社会管理时所选择应用。我国地方政府在举报式执法手段的选择与治理方式方面存在显著的地区差异性,以150787份通过公民举报而推进的行政处罚案件为研究对象,通过对中国各地区2015-2021年的面板数据进行测算与研究发现,地方财力、地方执法压力以及公众参与需求,是地方政府选择与公众进行合作、采取举报式执法治理手段的重要考量因素。此外,地方举报制度建设能够显著促进地方政府选择举报式执法,并提高合作治理程度。在下一阶段的中国社会治理改革中,地方政府应建立科学的举报奖励制度,促进政社合作,以举报式执法之优势缓解行政资源匮乏与政府信息不对称的治理问题。
Why Do Local Governments Promote Tip-off Enforcement?
Tip-off enforcement is a governing measure that subjects of action including government and the third party cooperate with each other and the law enforcement organization obtains law violation information based on citizens'tip-off and investigates illegal acts.As a typical cooperative governance practice,tip-off enforcement has both instrumental value and democratic value of social governance,so it is used by local governments in social management.It exerts an important role in solving government regulation failure and overcoming the incompatibility of traditional vertical and one-dimensional state governance mode.Chinese local governments show a significant regional difference in utilization of tip-off enforcement.So,when local law enforcement governments utilize tip-off,are there any rules to follow and are there any factors influencing the utilization of tip-off?Studying these questions will find out the reasons why local governments choose tip-off enforcement,thus specifically solving the higher-level law problem of promoting Chinese local governments to implement cooperative governance.The study starts from data of local governments,and 150,787 administrative punishment cases which are handled due to citizens'tip-off are used as the basic data.Besides,indicators such as local reporting system construction,local financial resources,local government law enforcement pressure,and public participation,are introduced to construct the panel data on reporting and law enforcement in various regions of China from 2015 to 2021.According to empirical research findings,local financial resources,local enforcement pressure and public participation demand are important consideration factors for local governments to choose to cooperate with the public and take tip-off enforcement governance measures.Local financial resources,local enforcement pressure and selection of tip-off enforcement measures show a significant negative correlation.Public participation demand and selection of tip-off enforcement measures show a significant positive correlation.Besides,the construction of local tip-off system can greatly promote local governments to choose tip-off enforcement and improve cooperative governance degree.Findings prove that local system,financial resources and press of local governance,and public participation are important indicators influencing selection of tip-off enforcement.This discovery inspires the next stage of Chinese social governance and reform as follows.First,improvement of local tip-off law construction is the key premise to promote tip-off enforcement.Guided by cooperative governance theory,building a scientific tip-off reward system and encouraging tip-off of illegal acts is the key to reduce asymmetric governmental information and improve law enforcement efficiency.Second,local governments should realize that cooperative governance is the development direction of China's social management.Cooperation will comprehensively improve social productivity and make the government to reduce the cost for obtaining private information and resources.Local governments should fully consider various factors,actively adjust social governance strategies,make full use of the information provided by the informant,and permit private power to support or to get involved in public governance as permitted by laws and regulations of cooperative governance according to the actual objective circumstances.Finally,as social power,citizens should participate in social governance,carry out social supervision,play the role of"participant"well,and promote the democracy course of grass-root social and economic governance.

Tip-off enforcementCooperative governanceAdministrative punishmentEmpirical research

万江、李璇

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西南政法大学经济法学院(重庆 401120)

举报式执法 合作治理 行政处罚 实证研究

重庆市社会科学基金重大项目

2020ZDSC06

2024

山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版)
山东大学

山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版)

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:1.151
ISSN:1001-9839
年,卷(期):2024.(1)
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