首页|获量配额管理中地方政府的失能与赋能——以渔业法律的责任体系与考评机制为视角

获量配额管理中地方政府的失能与赋能——以渔业法律的责任体系与考评机制为视角

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在我国渔业管理中,获量配额是一项"早早提出"却"未被贯彻"的管理模式。当前有关获量配额管理的学术研究大多集中在呼吁相关制度的贯彻落实,却不曾关注地方政府实施获量配额管理的动能。事实上,获量配额管理具备典型的行政发包制特性,其治理成败的关键之一是以科学的责任体系与考评机制来为地方政府赋能。Z省渔业权改革遇到了诸多阻碍,核心问题是地方政府在治理中的失能。而动能的匮乏又来源于渔业法律中不洽的责任体系与考评机制。解决失能问题的思路是修正责任体系与考评机制,即增设责任规则和重设考评标准,从而确保地方政府可以通过获量配额管理来获得相应政绩,进而为其重新赋能。围绕上述思路,渔业法律应当从全方位进行立法改革。
Incapacitation and Empowerment of Local Governments in Quota Management:From the Perspective of Responsibility System and Evaluation Mechanism in Fishery Law
Catch quota management represents a key shift in modern environmental rule of law,moving from individual to comprehensive governance approaches.The Chinese scholarly community initiated calls for its adoption in the 1980s,and the Fishery Law of the People's Republic of China integrated the nascent concept of catch quota management(fishing quotas)into its legal framework in 2000.Despite these early initiatives,the practical implementation of catch quota management in China has faced significant challenges.For instance,attempts to reform fishery rights in Z Province through catch quota management encountered numerous impediments.Most existing research on catch quota management has predominantly emphasized on the institutionalization of the system.Nonetheless,this study,informed by extensive fieldwork and interviews,identifies a critical impediment to the reform of fishery rights in Z Province:a lack of impetus in local governance.This inertia manifests in local governments'reluctance to place catch quota management in action over the input factor management,resulting in the delegation of responsibilities like the delineation of fishery rights and the establishment of transfer markets to subordinate governments and fishing associations.Consequently,the slow progress in defining fishery rights and developing a transfer market has compromised fishermen's interests and elicited opposition from various stakeholders within the fisheries sector.The cause of this inertia lies in the disconnect between China's existing fishery legal framework and local governments'execution of catch quota management.The majority of provisions in fishery laws,including the Fishery Law of the People's Republic of China,are predicated on input factors,with performance evaluations also tethered to the efficacy of input factor management.This construct implies that local governments are legally accountable for managing input factors rather than catch quotas.Therein lies the conundrum:local governments are at a loss on how to implement catch quota management in accordance with fishery laws and are unable to gain favorable performance evaluations through such management.Thus,there is a stark absence of motivation for local governments to implement catch quota management.Addressing this issue is pivotal and hinges on empowering local governments through fishery legislation to implement catch quotas.The solution proposed entails revising the fishery law to incorporate a new accountability framework and recalibrated evaluation metrics.This revision aims to ensure that local governments possess the knowledge to enact catch quota management and can secure commensurate recognition for their performance.Empowering local government through legislative means constitutes a vital first step towards the successful enactment of catch quota management in China.Subsequent to this,there remains a pressing need for further in-depth research into catch quota management by both Chinese academia and practitioners.

Fisheries managementQuotaLocal governmentsIncapacitationEmpowerment

姜渊

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宁波大学法学院(宁波 315211)

渔业管理 获量配额 地方政府 失能 赋能

国家社科基金重大项目

22&ZD138

2024

山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版)
山东大学

山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版)

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:1.151
ISSN:1001-9839
年,卷(期):2024.(2)
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