首页|政府参与高速公路数字化转型的演化博弈

政府参与高速公路数字化转型的演化博弈

Evolutionary game on government participation in expressways digital transformation

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引入演化博弈理论,构建政府、建设企业、承包企业的演化博弈模型,探讨政府激励对于高速公路数字化转型的策略影响,用MATLAB软件对影响高速公路数字化转型的关键因素进行仿真.研究表明:(1)转型成本、外部系数减少和转型所产生的附加收益等提高,可以显著促进企业参与数字化转型,而转型成本和外部系数较大会打击企业实施数字化转型的积极性.(2)政府激励力度达到一定水平时,会促进企业实施数字化,并且激励力度越大,越有利于企业协同参与数字化转型.综上,政府激励在一定程度上可以促进高速公路与数字经济的深度融合.
By incorporating evolutionary game theory,this study develops a model of evolutionary game dynamics involving governments,construction enterprises,and contracting enterprises to investigate the strategic effects of government incentives on the digital transformation of expressways.MATLAB simulations are employed to analyze the critical factors influencing expressways'digital transformation.The findings suggest that:(1)Reductions in transformation costs and external coefficients,coupled with increased additional benefits from transformation,significantly stimulate enterprise participation in digital transformation.Conversely,high transformation costs and external coefficients may dampen enterprise enthusiasm for digital transformation.(2)Government incentives,when reaching a certain threshold,can facilitate enterprise digital transformation,with higher incentive intensity fostering greater collaborative participation.In conclusion,government incentives play a pivotal role in fostering the deep integration of expressways into the digital economy.

government incentiveexpresswaydigital transformationevolutionary game

刘乐民、逯峰、付志超、潘祖请、谢磊

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山东高速基础设施建设有限公司,山东济南 250000

山东路科公路信息咨询有限公司,山东济南 250000

山东大学管理学院,山东济南 250100

政府激励 高速公路 数字化转型 演化博弈

教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目山东省高等学校青创团队计划项目

22YJC6300292023RW031

2024

山东大学学报(理学版)
山东大学

山东大学学报(理学版)

CSTPCD北大核心
影响因子:0.437
ISSN:1671-9352
年,卷(期):2024.59(9)
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