Government Audit,Management Characteristics and Shadow Banking of State-Owned Non-financial Enterprises
Taking the state-owned non-financial listed enterprises from 2010 to 2018 as the research object,this paper studies the relationship between the characteristics of executive government exterprise cooperation and promotion of the senior executives of the state-owned enterprises and shadow banking business under the supervision of government audit.The results show that the characteristics of government enterprise cooperation among executives in the state-owned non-financial enterprises is significantly negatively correlated with the scale of shadow banking business,and the promotion expectation of the senior executives is significantly positively correlated with the scale of shadow banking business.Government audit supervision strengthens the inhibition effect of political affiliation on shadow banking and inhibits the promotion effect of political promotion on shadow banking.Constrained corporate explicit financial assets will increase shadow banking.The research results provide theoretical support for preventing the real economy of the state-owned enterprises from"being diverted out of the real economy"and deepening the transmission path between government audit and the decision-making of the senior executives of the state-owned enterprises.In the future,the leadership of Communist Party of China should be further strengthened in the state-owned enterprises.The state audit institutions should increase the audit intensity and supply of audit resources to the state-owned enterprises where the senior executives are expected to be promoted.At the same time,the state-owned enterprises should allocate financial assets reasonably and reduce the misallocation rate of financial assets.
shadow banking of non-financial enterprisesscale of shadow banking businessmanagement characteristicspolitical promotiongovernment auditthe state-owned enterprises
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