首页|基于双边道德风险的社区团购平台动态契约研究

基于双边道德风险的社区团购平台动态契约研究

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基于社区团购模式中平台和团长之间的委托代理关系,构建了两阶段动态博弈模型,将社区团购平台的解聘补偿和团长的过度自信引入模型中,通过博弈推导和数值仿真给出两阶段最优动态契约设计,并分析这些因素对委托和代理方行为选择的影响,探讨其对双边道德风险的规制作用。结果表明:解聘补偿机制增加了社区团购平台的违约成本,降低平台道德风险。同时解聘倾向弱化了棘轮效应的负面影响,提高了团长第一期的努力程度,对团长第二期的努力程度没有直接作用,但会通过影响第二期的固定支付来影响双方的委托代理关系,对团长的道德风险起到间接规制作用。团长的过度自信倾向在一定程度上可以提高团长的努力程度,降低团长的道德风险,增加其收益。平台对团长资质和能力的动态修正可以影响团长的努力程度及其分成比例。因此,需要严把团长资质能力的早期识别,加强动态考核和定期培训以提升团长的业务能力和努力水平;同时设置合理的团长解聘补偿机制,完善动态激励契约;通过规制双边的道德风险,完善社区团购模式。
Dynamic Contract of Community Group Buying Platform Based on Bilateral Moral Hazard
Based on the principal-agent relationship between the platform and the group leader in the community group buying model,this paper constructs a two-stage dynamic game model,introduces the dismissal compensation of the community group buying platform and the overconfidence of the group leader into the model and works out the two-stage optimal dynamic contract design through game deduction and numerical simulation.Furthermore,the impact of these factors on the behavior choice of the principal and the agent is explored,and its regulatory role on bilateral moral hazard is discussed.It is found that the dismissal compensation mechanism increases the default cost of the platform and reduces the moral hazard of the platform.At the same time,the dismissal tendency weakens the negative impact of the ratchet effect,significantly improves the group leader's efforts in the first stage,but has no direct impact on his/her efforts in the second stage.However,it affects the principal-agent relationship of both parties by affecting the fixed payment in the second stage,which plays an indirect regulatory role on the leader's moral hazard.The leader's overconfidence tendency improves his/her efforts,reduces his/her moral hazard and increases his/her income to a certain extent.The platform's dynamic revision of the leader's qualification and competence can significantly affect the leader's efforts and share proportion.Therefore,it is necessary to strictly identify the leader's qualification and competence at an early stage,strengthen dynamic assessment and regular training to improve his/her professional competence and efforts.At the same time,it is essential to set up a reasonable dismissal compensation mechanism for the leader and improve the dynamic incentive contract.Only by regulating bilateral moral hazard,can the community group buying model be improved.

bilateral moral hazarddynamic contractdismissal compensationcommunity group buyingoverconfidence

王松、林雨

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山东科技大学经济管理学院,山东青岛 266590

双边道德风险 动态契约 解聘补偿 社区团购 过度自信

国家自然科学基金项目山东省社科规划项目

7147110518CGLJ38

2024

山东科技大学学报(社会科学版)
山东科技大学

山东科技大学学报(社会科学版)

CHSSCD
影响因子:0.336
ISSN:1008-7699
年,卷(期):2024.26(1)
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