Evolutionary Game Analysis of Power Battery Recovery after Cascade Utilization
In order to better process and dispose of the power batteries that are scrapped after cascade utilization,and help the"double carbon"goal,it is necessary to explore the costs and benefits of various stakeholders in the reverse logistics process of these power batteries.By establishing an evolutionary game model among the government,cascade utilization enterprises,and recycling businesses under the"dual-carbon"goal,we analyze the local stability of the equilibrium point and simulate the evolutionary process of each gaming agent.We also discuss the impact of key parameters on the behavioral evolution of the participating parties.Research shows that:(1)Environmental benefits significantly influence the strategic choices of the government and enterprises involved in cascade utilization.When environmental benefits decrease,the government tends to lean towards relaxed regulation,while enterprises in cascade utilization are more inclined to opt for third-party recycling strategies.(2)Increasing the probability of government inspections can encourage enterprises in cascade utilization and recyclers to choose participation in recycling as a stable strategy,but their sensitivity to strategic choices under the same conditions is different.Therefore,regulatory policies need to be differentiated according to the type of enterprise,especially increasing the regulatory penalties for enterprises in cascade utilization.(3)When the total cost of the recycling channel jointly established by enterprises in cascade utilization and recyclers remains unchanged,the variation in the cost-sharing coefficient does not significantly affect the stability of the system.
reverse logisticscascade utilizationpower batteryevolutionary game
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