Moral hazard represents a pivotal challenge in the design of China's deposit insurance system.An effectively designed pricing system is a crucial pathway to addressing moral hazard.However,current domestic literature on pricing inadequately addresses issues specific to China's reality.Creating a deposit insurance premium pricing system must be grounded in the unique context of China's savings structure and social system.This paper introduces a novel deposit insurance pricing table based on the Bloomberg Default Risk and Bloomberg Valuation Pricing models,integrating a quantitative matrix system and a comprehensive evaluation system into a bank scoring table.Combining pricing and scoring constraints,it proposes a new deposit insurance rate pricing system that holistically considers factors like banks'risk-taking,government capital injections,bank type differences,credit rating spectrums,differential rate systems,and punitive mechanisms.To validate the new rate system's rationality,the differential rate outcomes are assessed using the Cumulative Accuracy Profile curve,further estimating the target size of the fund,and validating its adequacy.The findings indicate that under this new rate system,state-owned large commercial banks are subject to a differential rate range of 0.005％to 0.095％,national commercial banks at 0.020％to 0.100％,and regional commercial banks at a distinctly tiered range of 0.025％to 0.200％.This new rate system demonstrates its effectiveness through cumulative accuracy profile curve assessment and fund adequacy validation.The article addresses theoretical gaps in the domestic design of differential deposit insurance rates and offers empirical support for policymaking by China's Deposit Insurance Corporation.
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