股票期权激励有助于减少企业违规吗?
Do Stock Option Incentives Help Reduce Corporate Violations?
王姝勋 1郑雨桐1
作者信息
- 1. 首都经济贸易大学金融学院,北京 100070
- 折叠
摘要
上市公司违规行为严重危害资本市场的健康稳定发展,股票期权激励作为现代公司内部治理的重要机制,能否发挥减少企业违规行为的作用有待研究.本文利用2011-2021年我国上市公司数据,考察了股票期权激励对企业违规行为的影响.实证发现:股票期权激励有助于减少企业违规行为.降低盈余管理和提高内部控制质量是股票期权激励减少企业违规行为的潜在作用机制.异质性分析结果表明,股票期权激励对企业违规行为的影响在未实施员工持股计划的企业、审计质量较低的企业以及非国有企业中更加显著.进一步研究发现,股票期权激励对非经营类违规和一般类违规的治理效果更加显著,较长的行权期限和较高的市场化程度有助于股票期权激励治理效应的发挥.
Abstract
The illegal behavior of listed companies seriously endangers the healthy and stable development of the capital market.As an important mechanism of modem corporate internal governance,whether stock option incentive can play a role in reducing corporate irregularities remains to be studied.Based on the data of listed companies in China from 2011 to 2021,this paper examines the impact of stock option incentives on corporate irregularities.It is found that stock option incentives help to reduce corporate irregularities.Reducing earnings management and improving the quality of internal control are the potential mechanisms for stock option incentives to reduce corporate violations.The results of heterogeneity analysis show that the impact of stock option incentives on illegal behavior is more significant in non-implemented employee stock ownership plans,low audit quality and non-state-owned enterprises.Further research shows that stock option incentive has more obvious governance effect on non-operating violations and general violations,and longer exercise period and higher degree of marketization contribute to the exertion of stock option incentive governance effect.The research of this paper not only enriches the literature on the incentive effect of stock options,but also has a certain reference significance for the governance of illegal behavior of listed companies.
关键词
股票期权激励/盈余管理/内部控制/公司治理Key words
Stock Option Incentive/Corporate Misconduct/Earning Management/Internal Control/Corporate Governance引用本文复制引用
基金项目
国家自然科学基金青年基金(72303159)
北京市教委科学研究计划(SM202110038003)
出版年
2024