监管型小股东"头雁"效应与企业并购——基于投服中心行权的经验证据
The Guiding Effect of Regulatory Minority Shareholders on Corporate mergers and Acquisitions:Evidence from China Securities Investor Services Center Exercise
刘春丽 1郜攀峰 1林斌2
作者信息
- 1. 合肥工业大学管理学院,合肥 230009
- 2. 中山大学管理学院,广州 510275
- 折叠
摘要
本文基于信号理论和有限注意力理论,以2016-2021年A股上市公司为样本,研究投服中心行权对上市公司并购的影响效果及作用机制.研究发现,投服中心行权传递出负面信号,被行权并购事件的市场反应较差.机制检验表明,投服中心行权引起投资者、媒体和监管部门对并购事件的负面关注,产生"头雁"引导效应.长期效应检验发现,对于被行权但成功并购的企业,其并购后的盈余操纵行为变少、长期并购绩效变好.
Abstract
Based on signal theory and limited attention theory,this study takes A-share listed firms from 2016 to 2021 as a sample to examine the impact and mechanisms of China Securities Investor Services Center(ISC)exercise behaviors on corporate mergers and acquisitions(M&As).We find that ISC exercises deliver negative signals,leading to poorer market responses to targeted M&A events.Mechanism tests show that ISC exercise attracts high attention from investors,media and regulatory authorities,which generates"guiding effect".Finally,long-term effect tests show that ISC targeted but successfully completed M&As have less earnings management and better long-term performance in post M&A periods.
关键词
投服中心/头雁效应/有限注意力理论Key words
Investor Services Center/Merger and Acquisition/Guiding Effect/Limited Attention Theory/Investor Protection引用本文复制引用
基金项目
安徽省哲学社会科学规划项目(AHSKY2022D133)
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据