Research on the Influence of Directors'and Officers'Liability Insurance on the Information Content of MD&A:Evidence from Text Similarity
Taking the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2016 to 2021 as samples,this paper empirically examines the impact of directors'and officers'liability insurance(D&O liability insurance)on the information content of MD&A.The research finds that D&O liability insurance can significantly enhance the information content of MD&A.The mechanism analysis indicates that D&O liability insurance can enhance the information content of MD&A by reducing agency costs and curbing management myopia,showing both supervisory and incentive effects.Heterogeneity test shows that D&O liability insurance has a more significant promoting effect on the information content of MD&A among companies with higher financing constraints,audited by non-Big4 accounting firms,with lower media attention,and in regions with lower level legalization.Besides,further research finds that equity incentives can strengthen the promoting effect of D&O liability insurance on the information content of MD&A,and this effect can help reduce the risk of stock price collapse.The paper expands on the relevant research regarding the economic consequences of D&O liability insurance and is of great significance for gaining a deeper understanding of the positive role of D&O liability insurance in corporate governance.
D&O liability InsuranceInformation Content of MD&AText Similarity
万方数据
