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民营企业逆向混改能够影响杠杆操纵行为吗?

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国有资本入股民营企业的逆向混改,能够有效抑制民营企业的杠杆操纵行为.本文以2010-2021年A股民营上市企业数据为样本,运用面板数据模型实证检验了逆向混改对企业杠杆操纵行为的影响.研究发现,民营企业逆向混改能显著抑制其杠杆操纵行为,而且在考虑了内生性之后这一结论依然成立.机制检验结果显示,通过逆向混改来缓解融资约束,民营企业能够显著减少杠杆操纵行为;通过逆向混改来提高企业的市场竞争力,民营企业能够显著抑制杠杆操纵行为.异质性分析表明,企业债务融资成本越高,逆向混改对杠杆操纵行为的抑制就越显著;两权分离率越低,逆向混改对杠杆操纵行为的抑制就越显著.
Can Reverse Mixed-ownership Reform in Private Enterprises Influence Corporate Leverage Manipulation Behavior?
The reverse mixed-ownership reform,in which state-owned capital acquires stakes in private enterprises,can effectively curb leverage manipulation behavior in private firms.Using data from A-share listed private companies from 2010 to 2021,this paper empirically examines the impact of reverse mixed-ownership reform on corporate leverage manipulation behavior through a panel data model.The study finds that reverse mixed-ownership reform significantly suppresses leverage manipulation in private enterprises,and this conclusion remains robust even after accounting for endogeneity.Mechanism tests indicate that alleviating financing constraints through reverse mixed-ownership reform allows private enterprises to significantly reduce leverage manipulation.Additionally,enhancing market competitiveness through reverse mixed-ownership reform also significantly curbs leverage manipulation in private enterprises.Heterogeneity analysis reveals that the higher the cost of debt financing,the more significant the inhibitory effect of reverse mixed-ownership reform on leverage manipulation;similarly,the lower the degree of separation between ownership and control,the more significant the effect.

Reverse Mixed-ownership ReformLeverage ManipulationDebt Financing Cost

秦海林、赵鑫

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天津工业大学,天津 300387

逆向混改 杠杆操纵 债务融资成本

2024

上海金融
上海市金融学会

上海金融

CSTPCDCHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:0.912
ISSN:1006-1428
年,卷(期):2024.(7)