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企业ESG表现与高管机会主义减持:抑制还是促进?

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本文使用沪深A股上市企业的相关数据,实证检验了企业ESG表现对高管机会主义减持的影响.研究结果表明,良好的ESG表现能够显著抑制高管机会主义减持,具体表现为高管机会主义减持金额和次数均更少,该结论在经过一系列内生性及稳健性检验后依然成立.作用机制检验发现,企业ESG表现主要通过改善企业信息透明度、弱化委托代理冲突以及降低股票错误定价等途径抑制高管机会主义减持.异质性分析表明,企业ESG表现对高管机会主义减持的抑制效应在非国有企业、机构投资者持股比例较低的企业以及所处法治环境较差地区的企业中更为显著.拓展性分析发现,企业ESG表现通过抑制高管机会主义减持次数,缓解了由其引发的公司股价崩盘风险.
Enterprise ESG Performance and Executives'Opportunistic Stock Selling:Inhibition or Promotion?
Using relevant data from A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen,this study empirically examines the impact of enterprise ESG performance on executives'opportunistic stock selling.The results show that good ESG performance can significantly inhibit opportunistic stock selling by executives.It is manifested in the fact that the amount and frequenay of opportunistic stock selling by executives are fewer,and this conclusion still holds true after a series of endogeneity and robustness tests.The mechanism test shows that ESG performance inhibits executives'opportunistic stock selling mainly by improving corporate information transparency,weakening principle-agent conflicts and reducing stock mispricing.Heterogeneity analysis shows that the inhibitory effect of enterprise ESG performance on executives'opportunistic stock selling is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises,enterprises with lower institutional investor shareholding ratios,and enterprises located in areas with poor legal environments.The expanded analysis finds that ESG performance alleviates the risk of stock price crash by restraining executives'opportunistic stock selling.

Enterprise ESG PerformanceOpportunistic Stock SellingInformation TransparencyAgency ConflictsStock Mispricing

喻彪、杨刚

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贵州工程应用技术学院经济与管理学院/贯彻新发展理念毕节示范区研究中心,贵州毕节 551700

西南大学经济管理学院,重庆 400715

企业ESG表现 机会主义减持 信息透明度 委托代理冲突 股票错误定价

2024

上海金融
上海市金融学会

上海金融

CSTPCDCHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:0.912
ISSN:1006-1428
年,卷(期):2024.(9)