社会科学论坛2024,Issue(4) :132-141.

强人工智能刑事责任主体资格的否定

The Negation of the Subjective Qualification of Criminal Liability of Strong Artificial Intelligence

任彦君 聂冉
社会科学论坛2024,Issue(4) :132-141.

强人工智能刑事责任主体资格的否定

The Negation of the Subjective Qualification of Criminal Liability of Strong Artificial Intelligence

任彦君 1聂冉1
扫码查看

作者信息

  • 1. 河南财经政法大学刑事司法学院,河南郑州 450046
  • 折叠

摘要

在是否应当赋予强人工智能刑事责任主体资格的论战中,否定论具有逻辑严密性与结论正当性.首先,从实证角度出发,在强人工智能的发展进路中,存在大量科技、哲学难题,强人工智能时代难以来临.其次,假设强人工智能存在,其所具备的辨认与控制能力也并无刑法意义,因此无法被认定为刑事责任主体.再次,对强人工智能施加刑罚,难以实现报应目的与预防目的.最后,基于刑法人类中心主义,理应排除强人工智能的刑事责任主体地位.

Abstract

In the debate on whether strong artificial intelligence should be given the qualification of criminal liability subject,the negation theory has logical rigour and justification of conclusion.Firstly,from the empirical point of view,there are a large number of scientific and technological and philosophical difficulties in the development of strong artificial intelligence,and it is difficult for the era of strong artificial intelligence to come.Secondly,if there is strong artificial intelligence,its ability to recognize and control has no meaning in criminal law,and therefore it cannot be recognized as a subject of criminal responsibility.Thirdly,it is difficult to achieve retributive and preventive purposes by imposing penalties on strong artificial intelligence.Finally,on the basis of anthropocentrism in criminal law,strong artificial intelligence should be excluded as a subject of criminal responsibility.

关键词

强人工智能/责任非难/报应/特殊预防/一般预防

Key words

strong artificial intelligence/liability/retribution/special prevention/general prevention

引用本文复制引用

基金项目

2022年国家社会科学基金年度项目(22BFX064)

出版年

2024
社会科学论坛
河北省社会科学界联合会

社会科学论坛

CHSSCD
影响因子:0.166
ISSN:1008-2026
段落导航相关论文