Norm Costs,Interdependence and Sanctions Stalemate:The US Economic Sanctions from a Conflict Perspective
Economic sanctions,as the most frequently employed non-violent foreign poli-cy tool since the Cold War,have received wide academic interest.Extant research,howev-er,predominantly adopts a Western(US)perspective,focusing on the effectiveness of sanction policies and the underlying mechanisms.This paper adopts the perspective of the sanctioned country,viewing sanctions as a political conflict initiated by the United States a-gainst the target country through economic means.It focuses on the highest intensity of con-flict,the"sanctions deadlock,"and,based on signal theory,explains both the motiva-tion and power factors that lead the United States and the target country into a"sanctions deadlock".Regarding motivation,this paper categorizes US-initiated sanctions into two types:normative sanctions and self-interest sanctions.In normative sanctions,as the norm-ative costs borne by the United States to maintain leadership order increase,the probability of both sides entering a deadlock also increases.In terms of power,it divides the trade de-pendence between the two sides into imports and exports.By introducing the global value chain theory,it points out that the asymmetric interdependence between the target country and the United States in import trade is the core of their power differences.This easily leads to strategic misjudgment,namely signal distortion,resulting in a non-linear positive U-shaped curve relationship in the probability of both sides entering a sanctions deadlock.Specifically,when the target country's dependence on US imports gradually rises from"very low"to"medium",the probability of a deadlock decreases.However,as the dependence increases from"medium"to"very high",this probability gradually rises.
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