Territorial Disputes and Alliance Formation:The Entrapment Risk
A state(State B)that is involved in a territorial dispute may seek an external ally(State A)to help itself fight against the territorial adversary(State C).However,State A may worry about the entrapment risk.This is because both State B and State C may address the territorial dispute aggressively,and State B may escalate the dispute purposeful-ly after allying with State A.Besides,policy tools like constraining and abandoning State B may not work as effectively as people previously expected.Therefore,the entrapment risk would prevent State A from allying with State B.However,things are different in the post-World War Ⅱ period.With the spread of the territorial integrity norm,a state addresses a ter-ritorial dispute in a less aggressive manner,which in turn makes militarized confrontations less likely.This fact eases the entrapment risk,plus the benefits of allying,and thus State A is willing to ally with State B.A quantitative analysis based on data within the 1816-2001 period supports the argument.This article shows that,within the territorial context,the en-trapment risk may prevent states from allying with each other.Also,the risk comes from both a potential ally and its adversary.These findings could also inform states of how to ad-dress their territorial disputes properly.
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