领土争端与国家间结盟:被牵连的风险
Territorial Disputes and Alliance Formation:The Entrapment Risk
姚炯1
作者信息
- 1. 中山大学国际关系学院 珠海 519000
- 折叠
摘要
面临领土争端的国家可能会请求与他国结盟,力图在争端中不落下风,潜在结盟国却担忧可能被牵连.这是因为求盟国及其领土对手在处理领土争端时的强硬行事逻辑以及求盟国在结盟后可能采取的别有用心的行为增大了(激烈的)领土军事冲突爆发的概率,而约束盟友和弃盟等手段的规避风险效果也较有限,因此对于被牵连风险的顾虑妨碍了潜在结盟国与求盟国之间的联合.然而第二次世界大战后,领土完整行为规范的普及改变了国家处理领土争端的方式,显著减小了(激烈的)领土军事冲突爆发的概率,这也缓解了潜在结盟国的被牵连顾虑,加之结盟有利可图,潜在结盟国因而愿与求盟国联手.基于1816-2001年相关数据的一系列实证检验支持这一论述.作者论证了被牵连风险对于国家间结盟的影响,强调这一风险与一国的潜在结盟国及后者的对手均有关.基于这一发现,现实中一国可以主动采取措施,增加领土对手的潜在盟友对于被牵连风险的顾虑,从而阻止两者联手,防止领土争端局面进一步复杂化.
Abstract
A state(State B)that is involved in a territorial dispute may seek an external ally(State A)to help itself fight against the territorial adversary(State C).However,State A may worry about the entrapment risk.This is because both State B and State C may address the territorial dispute aggressively,and State B may escalate the dispute purposeful-ly after allying with State A.Besides,policy tools like constraining and abandoning State B may not work as effectively as people previously expected.Therefore,the entrapment risk would prevent State A from allying with State B.However,things are different in the post-World War Ⅱ period.With the spread of the territorial integrity norm,a state addresses a ter-ritorial dispute in a less aggressive manner,which in turn makes militarized confrontations less likely.This fact eases the entrapment risk,plus the benefits of allying,and thus State A is willing to ally with State B.A quantitative analysis based on data within the 1816-2001 period supports the argument.This article shows that,within the territorial context,the en-trapment risk may prevent states from allying with each other.Also,the risk comes from both a potential ally and its adversary.These findings could also inform states of how to ad-dress their territorial disputes properly.
关键词
领土争端/联盟/被牵连风险/军事冲突/领土完整行为规范Key words
territorial dispute/alliance/entrapment risk/militarized dispute/territorial integrity norm引用本文复制引用
基金项目
国家社会科学基金青年项目(22CGJ002)
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据