Transparency Crisis?International Compliance from a Bargaining Perspective
The violation of international agreements poses an important risk to global peace and development.While previous research has focused on the behavior of sovereign states after signing international agreements,the impact of international monitoring agencies on compliance,and the use of sanctions to prevent noncompliance,little attention has been paid to the influence of the international policy-making process on compliance out-comes.This study aims to fill this gap by developing and empirically examining a game theo-retical model of closed-door bargaining that not only affects the outcome of an international agreement but also its compliance.This paper argues that states face uncertainty regarding the biases of their representatives in international negotiations.Under uncertainty,the infor-mation obtained from the bargaining process is crucial for states to update their beliefs about representative biases,which in turn impacts compliance with international agreements.Closed-door bargaining,in which only the final agreement is observable,conceals biased representatives and,under certain conditions,encourages compliance.Furthermore,the impact of the bargaining process on international compliance outcomes is contingent on en-dogenous factors like public trust.In a political environment with high public trust and mini-mal concerns about the legitimacy of international agreements,closed-door negotiations can enhance efficiency and facilitate the formulation and implementation of international agree-ments.Using a most recent data set from the European Union,this paper empirically exam-ines the theoretical implications derived from the model and finds support for the argu-ment.The study also demonstrates the conditionality of democratic compliance theory and highlights the positive effect of an efficient and credible international policy-making process on compliance.
international complianceinternational bargainingEuropeanUniongame theorybargaining transparency
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