Bidirectional Disrespect,Non-Optimal Strategical Choice and the Formation of Crisis Impasse
When some international crises are used as a means for initiators,rational leaders are supposed to tend to avoid costing too much,and hope to end the crises as soon as possible.Such crises are originally just conceived as a means to achieve the leaders'pri-mary goals.While these kinds of crises cause continuous and unnecessary losses to both sides,rational leaders do not end them quickly and then the crisis may escalate into the next stage of over-prolonged stalemates.The traditional signaling game theory's explanation to the puzzle above is limited due to its idealized rational behavior assumption,and the po-litical psychological approach also lacks a specific causal mechanism.Since the disrespect factor is a deep motivator of such crises,the authors propose a bounded rationality signaling game model by introducing the disrespect factor into traditional signaling game theory.It suggests that the disrespectful behavior towards each other during a crisis could generate misperceptions and emotions of both the leaders and the public,and then trigger irrational choices among the leaders.Finally,both sides may deviate from the optimal solution that could end the crisis,and choose a non-optimal strategy,which ultimately falls into an un-intended impasse situation.As a case study,the Iran hostage crisis validates the theoretical explanatory power of the bounded rationality signaling game model through analyzing the for-mation of crisis impasse.
international crisisdisrespectful behaviorgame of signalingcrisis im-passeIran hostage crisis
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