The Burden of Good Reputation:Conflict Expectation and Remoderating Alliance Reputation
States'reputation within an alliance encompasses both direct and indirect repu-tations.Direct reputation derives from states'historical interactions with specific allies,while indirect reputation stems from interactions with third-party allies.Direct reputation re-flects states'reliability.The better a state's direct reputation,the higher the probability of fulfilling alliance commitments,thereby increasing the ally's willingness to initiate conflicts.Indirect reputation signals states'preferences in resource allocation.The better a state's in-direct reputation,the more resources are likely to be allocated to third-party allies,thereby decreasing the specific ally's willingness to initiate conflicts.Both direct and indirect repu-tations influence states'risk of entrapment and abandonment through positive feedback mechanisms,prompting states to actively manage their reputations by taking measures to re-strain or assure allies.States with a better indirect reputation may maintain support for spe-cific allies to reduce the risk of abandonment,while those with a better direct reputation may limit specific allies'use of force to reduce the risk of entrapment.Given that major powers have greater freedom in resource allocation,the inhibitory effect of powers'indirect reputation on allies'conflict propensity is relatively lower.States with a good indirect repu-tation exhibit a higher degree of interest divergence with specific allies;thus,states posses-sing both good direct and indirect reputations are more motivated to restrain allies.Based on statistical tests of alliance reputation and conflict data from 1816 to 2001,as well as a case study of the US-ROK alliance from 1961 to 1976,it is evident that states pursue an opti-mal,rather than maximal level of alliance reputation.This finding explains the fluctuations in states'alliance reputations and the varying probability of allies initiating conflicts.
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