The Paradox of Inclusion:Ethnic Power Sharing and Civil Conflict in Developing Countries
Power-sharing systems that involve various ethnic groups in the executive deci-sion-making process are often used to mitigate conflict in multi-ethnic countries.However,these systems have produced mixed results.While they have brought peace to some nations,they have led to political instability in others.This variation may stem from the challenges faced by developing countries,where political and economic modernization is lagging be-hind.In such contexts,ethnic power-sharing can expand patronage networks and increase demand for public goods from different ethnic groups.Political elites'ability to meet these demands often depends on the availability of natural resource revenues.Thus,the impact of ethnic power-sharing on civil conflict is moderated by natural resource revenues.A country can only mitigate civil conflict if it has both the capacity to expand its patronage network through ethnic power-sharing and sufficient natural resource revenues to support this net-work.Quantitative research,combined with comparative case studies of Ghana,Nigeria,Kenya,and Zimbabwe,provides insights into the causal process by which ethnic power-sharing and natural resource revenues affect civil conflict.
ethnic power sharingcivil conflictnatural resource revenuespatronage networkinformal institutions
万方数据
维普
