川渝跨界流域合作治理内生动力演化研究
Study on the endogenous dynamic evolution of co-governance of the transboundary watershed in Sichuan and Chongqing
吴文建 1陶宇 1张磊1
作者信息
- 1. 重庆科技大学法政与经贸学院,重庆 401331
- 折叠
摘要
基于集体行动困境逻辑分析了影响川渝两地跨界流域共治的经济、责任、社会和政绩四类内生动力因素,通过构建地方政府采取合作治理行动策略的猎鹿模型探析了合作治理的演化稳定均衡策略,并考察了各动力因素对演化稳定均衡状态的影响.研究发现,演化稳定均衡策略取决于搭便车收益概率;责任风险比政绩、社会效益更有利于激发两地合作的主动性;两地治理收益不对等对合作集体行动演化较敏感.
Abstract
Based on the logic of collective action dilemma,the paper examines four endogenous driving factors that affect the co-governance of cross-border watersheds in Sichuan and Chongqing:economic,responsibility,social,and political achievements.It constructs a deer hunting model for local governments to adopt cooperative governance action strategy,and analyzes the evolution and stability of such strategies.It also investigates the influence of various driving factors on the evolutionary equilibrium state,and puts forward some suggestions for realizing the ideal evolutionary stability strategy.It is found that the evolutionary stable equilibrium strategy depends on the free rider probability.Responsibility risk is more conducive to stimulate the initiative of cooperation between the two places than political achievements and social benefits.The inequality of governance benefits between the two places is more sensitive to the evolution of cooperative collective action.
关键词
流域共治/演化博弈/集体行动/猎鹿模型/川渝地区Key words
watershed co-governance/evolutionary game/collective action/deer hunting model/Sichuan Chongqing area引用本文复制引用
基金项目
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(20YJC790128)
重庆市高等教育教学改革研究项目(2021GX032)
出版年
2024
国家科技期刊平台
NSTL
维普
万方数据