In the political operation of grassroots performance evaluation in China,strong incentives and weak incentives coexist.Based on field observations of the performance evaluation practice process,when faced with the same evaluation plan,the huge difference in signal transmission be-tween the superior leader as the signaler and the evaluation object as the signal receiver,as well as the difference in the role of opinion leaders played by the evaluation party,often leads to a state of change in incentive,which in turn triggers four incentive patterns:"compatible strong incentive""mobilization strong incentive""fatigue weak incentive"and"passive weak incentive".The evalua-tion party implements the assessment based on the will of the superior leaders and plays an impor-tant role as an opinion leader in the signal transmission process between the superior leaders and the evaluation objects.Under the influence of the superior leaders'signal release,their own signal per-ception,and the evaluation party,the evaluation objects independently present a distinct incentive state in the process of advancing tasks,and rationally adapt to the entire grassroots political ecolo-gy.The proposal of the"Signal Transmission-Opinion Leader"framework not only strengthens the explanatory power of evaluation incentives at the micro level,but also helps to address the issue of incentive bias in grassroots evaluations.At the same time,it provides theoretical inspiration and practical reference for cadre management.
国家科技期刊平台
NSTL
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