The stock market connectivity mechanism based on the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect and Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect is an important capital market liberalization measure implemented by China in recent years.How to optimize regulatory methods and ultimately improve the efficiency of the enforcement under the conditions of capital market liberalization has always been a focus of attention for regulatory authorities.Using the difference-in-differences method,this paper tests the impact of the Shanghai/Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect on the administrative punitive supervision.The result shows that the implementation of the Shanghai/Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect has significantly reduced the possibility and intensity of the administrative punitive supervision of the eligible firms.This result is mainly revealed in private firms,firms with less QFII shareholdings and firms with more analysts'attention.The expansion test finds that the impact of the Shanghai/Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect is mainly caused by the active trading shares and the firms with more foreign shareholdings.In addition,further tests show that the timeliness and accuracy of the administrative punitive supervision have significantly improved after the Shanghai/Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect.The conclusion has important implications for improving the quality and efficiency of capital market regulation in the context of continuously deepening the institutional opening of the capital market.
关键词
沪深港通/行政处罚性监管/股票市场开放
Key words
Shanghai/Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect/Administrative Punitive Supervision/Stock Market Liberalization
维普
万方数据