董事高管责任保险与上市公司异常停牌
Directors'and Officers'Liability Insurance and Listed Companies'Abnormal Trading Halts
文雯 1李双玉 2张梦娇 3徐国铨1
作者信息
- 1. 北京外国语大学国际商学院
- 2. 北京师范大学法学院
- 3. 厦门大学财务管理与会计研究院
- 折叠
摘要
本文以我国2002-2021年A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验董事高管责任保险对上市公司异常停牌的影响.研究结果表明,董事高管责任保险对上市公司异常停牌的概率与总时长有显著的抑制作用;机制检验表明,这种负向影响主要体现为提高企业信息透明度、缓解代理问题以及增加外部关注等渠道;此外,该抑制作用在管理层持股比例更高、机构投资者持股比例更高的企业中更加显著.研究结论为董事高管责任保险的公司治理效应提供新的经验证据.
Abstract
Using a sample of Chinese listed companies from 2002-2021,this research empirically investigates the impact of D&O liability insurance on listed companies'abnormal trading halts.The results show that D&O insurance has a significant restraining effect on the probability and duration of abnormal trading halts of listed companies.Mechanism tests show that D&O insurance can restrain listed companies from abnormal trading halts through alleviating the agency problem,improving corporate informa-tion transparency,and enhancing external monitoring.Further analyses reveal that the inhibitory effect of D&O liability insurance on abnormal trading halts is more significant in enterprises with higher proportion of managerial ownership and institutional shareholding,indicating that a better internal and external environment can promote the governance effect of D&O liability insur-ance.The results provide new empirical evidence for the corporate governance effect of D&O liability insurance.
关键词
董事高管责任保险/异常停牌/代理问题/信息透明度Key words
Directors'and officers'liability insurance/Abnormal trading halts/Agency problem/Information transparency引用本文复制引用
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
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