Considering that consumers have quality preferences for products and manufacturers produce heterogeneous products,a Stackelberg game model is constructed for a dual channel supply chain that does not provide extended warranty,only manufactu rers provide extended warranty,and only retailers provide extended warranty.By analyzing the optimal decisions of manufacturers and retailers,and comparing supply chain performance under different models,this paper explores the issue of selecting distribu tion strategies for extended warranty services.The results indicate that providing extended warranty services can increase the profits of the entities providing extended warranty services,while the profits of those who do not provide extended warranty services rema in unchanged;and providing extended warranty services can make the self profit of the entity providing extended warranty services greater than the self profit of the entity not providing extended warranty services;Both manufacturers providing extended wa rranty and retailers providing extended warranty will increase the profits of the supply chain system,while manufacturers selling extended warran ty services can be more beneficial to the overall performance of the supply chain.Finally,this article uses numerical examples to verify the effectiveness of the obtained conclusions and provide corresponding management insights.
dual channelextended warranty servicesquality preferenceStackelberg game