首页|零售商公平关切下闭环供应链产品升级生产与协调机制研究

零售商公平关切下闭环供应链产品升级生产与协调机制研究

扫码查看
研究了由一个制造商和零售商组成的产品升级闭环供应链的生产协调问题.引入公平关切系数后,分别讨论了产品升级闭环供应链集中与分散模型下的最优生产决策,分析零售商公平关切行为、产品升级前后性能差距对产品升级闭环供应链利润的影响,并提出"定价契约"对产品升级闭环供应链利润进行协调.研究表明,制造商需要合理控制升级前后产品性能差距才能使得升级前后产品拥有更好的市场;随着零售商公平关切行为程度的提升,制造商的利润会向零售商发生转移;控制升级性能差距不变,产品不断地推陈出新会提高供应链的整体收益;采用"定价契约"可以协调制造商和零售商之间的收益,实现帕累托优化.
Product Upgrading,Production and Coordination of Closed-loop Supply Chain Considering Retailer Fairness Concern
With the continuous advancement of science and technology,product upgrading and replace-ment come at increasingly short intervals,resulting in the shortening of product life cycle.At the same time,as people become more and more aware of environmental protection and waste recycling,the closed-loop sup-ply chain has attracted the attention of enterprises and governments around the world.In this paper,we studied the production and profit coordination of a closed-loop supply chain that takes product upgrading,consumer upgrade preferences,and fairness concerns into consideration.In this closed-loop supply chain,the manufac-turer and the retailer would negotiate to adjust their revenue ratio through a profit-sharing mechanism so as to maximize the overall profit of the supply chain,and on this premise,achieve Pareto optimization for the manu-facturer and the retailer.Then after introducing in the fairness concern coefficient,we discussed the optimal production strategy of the closed-loop supply chain under the centralized and decentralized decision-making mode respectively,and analyzed the impact of retailer fairness concern and the difference of product perfor-mance before and after upgrade on the profit of the supply chain.Using the Stackelberg game method,we con-structed three models,namely the centralized decision-making model,the decentralized decision-making model without fairness concern,and the decentralized decision-making model with fairness concern,and through parameter comparison,explored the optimal product upgrade strategy for the supply chain.Then in a numerical simulation,we compared the calculation results of the above models and found that(1)The retail-er's fair concern behavior would cause the manufacturer to lower the wholesale price,which to a certain extent constitutes a"profit-surrendering"behavior.(2)Product upgrade can increase the profit of both the manufac-turer and the retailer,and as the leap in performance before and after the upgrade widens,the profit of both par-ties will rise sharply.(3)There is competition between the products with and without upgrade,and the manu-facturer need to reasonably control the performance gap before and after the upgrade so that both the products before and after the upgrade can have better market demand,while given constant performance gap before and after upgrade,continuous product innovation would increase the overall benefits of the supply chain.(4)The fairness concern of the retailer would not affect the retail price and demand of the product,but could,to a cer-tain extent,propel the manufacturer to lower the wholesale price.Finally,we designed a pricing contract coor-dination model for the closed-loop supply chain and by adjusting the relevant parameters,found that under the pricing contract coordination model,the benefits of each member were higher than those under decentral-ized decision-making and the coordinated supply chain achieved Pareto optimization and realized overall prof-it equal to that under centralized decision-making,which indicates that the pricing contract could well coordi-nate the closed-loop supply chain.

closed-loop supply chainproduct upgradefairness concernsupply chain coordination

邢光军、孙茂松

展开 >

南京邮电大学 管理学院,江苏 南京 210003

闭环供应链 产品升级 公平关切 供应链协调

江苏省社会科学基金江苏省高等学校哲学社会科学重点研究基地开放课题江苏省现代信息服务业决策咨询研究基地开放课题江苏省研究生科研创新计划

14HQ005JDS213004NYJD217009KYCX22_0869

2024

物流技术
中国物流生产力促进中心 中国物资流通学会物流技术经济委员会 全国物资流通科技情报站 湖北物资流通技术研究所

物流技术

影响因子:0.506
ISSN:1005-152X
年,卷(期):2024.43(2)
  • 16