Operational Decision and Coordination Contract of Dual-channel Green Supply Chain Considering Risk Aversion under Government Subsidies
"Made in China 2025"puts forward the goal of fully implementing green manufacturing to build an efficient and clean green manufacturing system.However,due to the uncertainty in the develop-ment of green products and the limit in loss tolerance,enterprises need to consider the impact of risks when making decisions.The government usually provides subsidies for green products to encourage enterprises to increase investment in green research and development and improve the greenness of products.At the same time,the rapid development of e-commerce has prompted changes in the structure of current consumption channels,for example,food enterprises such as COFCO and Shuanghui have begun online sales through electronic trading platforms,including Womaiwang and JD Fresh.In such context,we constructed a manufacturer-led dual-channel green supply chain game model.Con-sidering risk factors and using the mean-variance method,we analyzed the decision-making and utility of the dual-channel green supply chain under four modes,namely both risk neutral(RN),both risk aversive(RA),only manufacturer risk aversive(MRA)and only retailer risk aversive(RRA).Then,we designed a cost-sharing contract with transfer payments to achieve supply chain coordination.The results show that:(1)Under different models,the relationship between product greenness and risk aversion is different.Under RA and MRA,product greenness is negatively correlated with risk aversion,while under RN,product greenness is positively correlated with risk aversion.Under different models,retail price is related to risk aversion and government subsidy.When R&D cost coefficient is small,retail prices un-der different models are positively correlated with government subsidies.When the R&D cost coefficient is large,the retail prices under different models are negatively correlated with government subsidies.Under RRA,when R&D cost coefficient is small,the retail price is positively correlated with risk aversion.When R&D cost coefficient is large,the retail price is negatively correlated with risk aversion.Under both RA and MRA,the retail prices are negatively correlated with risk aversion.(2)Under the four models,the utility of both parties is positively correlated with government subsidies.Especially under RRA,manufacturer utility is significantly affected by government subsidies.Under RA,the utility of both parties is negatively correlat-ed with risk aversion.In addition,through the cost-sharing contract with transfer payments,both parties can achieve green supply chain coordination.Cost-sharing ratio is negatively correlated with risk aversion and positively correlated with government subsidies.Compared with government subsidies,risk aversion has more significant impact on transfer payments,and reduces the bargaining range of the transfer payments be-tween the two parties.The above conclusions can provide important theoretical and practical guidance for decision-making,co-ordination,and management of dual-channel green supply chains.
risk aversiongovernment subsidydual-channel green supply chainoperational decisionco-ordination contract
万方数据
维普
