Behavior of Supply Chain Disruption Risk Prevention and Solution:A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis
Based on the principle of maximum value,we constructed a behavioral evolution game model for the three subjects of the government,supply chain enterprises and industrial associations to prevent and resolve the risk of supply chain disruption,and conducted an equilibrium analysis.Using MATLAB,we sim-ulated the strategy selection process of the three subjects.The results show that(1)the probability of government taking charge of supply chain disruption risk pre-vention(x)is an increasing function of revenue for the government taking charge of supply chain disruption risk prevention(R1),supply chain disruption risk scale(S),social reputation effect(M),government support funds(W),the government'proportion of supply chain disruption risk(p),and the government's proportion of social reputation effect(q),and a decreasing function of cost for the government taking charge of supply chain disruption risk prevention(C1).(2)The probability of the enterprise taking charge of supply chain disruption risk resolution(y)is an in-creasing function of revenue for the enterprise taking charge of supply chain disruption risk resolution(R2),government support funds(W)and the enterprise's proportion of government support funds(β),and a de-creasing function of cost for the enterprise taking charge of supply chain disruption risk resolution(C2),sup-ply chain disruption risk scale(S)and the government's proportion of supply chain disruption risk(p).(3)The probability of the industrial association taking charge of guidance(z)is an increasing function of revenue for the industrial association taking charge of guidance(R3),social reputation effect(M),govern-ment support funds(W),the government's proportion of social reputation effect(q),and the enterprise's proportion of government support funds(β),and a decreasing function of cost for the industrial association taking charge of guidance(C3).(4)The government's strategy choice is greatly influenced by the government's proportion of supply chain disruption risk(p).When p is greater than 80%,the government tends to not take charge of supply chain disruption risk prevention.(5)The industrial association's strategy choice is greatly influenced by the enterprise's proportion of gov-ernment support funds(β).When β is higher than 90%,the industry association tends to not take charge of guidance for the purpose of maximizing its own value.Based on the research results,we drew conclusions as follows:the government should actively build high-quality supply chain,strengthen risk management and multi-dimensional coordination;enterprises should make every effort to strengthen supply chain resilience,improve their ability of risk control and manage-ment;industrial associations should provide comprehensive supply chain risk management services and sup-port,and promote talent education and cultivation systems;and the three subjects should collaborate to achieve the ideal decision of each subject.
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