High-end manufacturing is an important object of the Made in China 2025 campaign and the 13th Five-Year Development Plan,and is one of the key points of the future development blueprint of Chi-na.The Chinese high-end equipment manufacturing industry is under the dual squeeze of"reshoring"by developed countries in the high-end sector and"substitution and diversion"by developing countries in the medium and low sectors.Only by vigorously advocating the high-end equipment manufacturing industry can we gradually master core key technologies and command industrial discourse power,and lead the overall development trend of the high-end equipment manufacturing industry.The current complex political and economic factors have given rise to the disruption of the domestic high-end manufacturing supply chain.In the context of dual-source procurement disruption,how to effectively reduce the impact of disruption on the high-end manufacturing supply chain through coordination contract,and how to better coordinate man-ufacturers and domestic suppliers to improve the level of innovation have become urgent issues to be solved in the development of the high-end manufacturing supply chain.By reviewing previous studies and in light of the current situation,we examined a dual-source procure-ment model with interruption risk for a supply chain consisting of domestic and foreign suppliers and manu-facturers.According to the model,all the agents aim to maximize their own expected profits,where the man-ufacturer,as the leader of the supply chain,preemptively decides the price,and the domestic and foreign sup-pliers,as followers,decide on their individual innovation input subsequently.Next,using the Stackelberg game method,we studied the role of no coordination contract,cost sharing contract,price subsidy+cost sharing contract in improving the level of innovation input and expected profit of the supply chain,and used Mathematica to analyze the impact of model parameters on the optimization results.The results showed that as the proportion of sharing/subsidization by the manufacturer to the domestic suppliers increases,the inno-vation input and expected profit of the domestic suppliers would somewhat increase;the cost sharing con-tract alone cannot effectively coordinate the manufacturer and the domestic suppliers;under certain condi-tions,the price subsidy+cost sharing contract could effectively coordinate the manufacturer and the domes-tic suppliers to achieve Pareto improvement;and through contract coordination,the domestic suppliers will increase innovation input and thus expand market demand,and the foreign suppliers will also be benefited from"free riding".This study only considered a two-echelon supply chain.In reality,the structure of a high-end manufac-turing supply chain is more complex.In the future,we hope to expand the scope to include to a three-eche-lon supply chain and further study the game model with two mutually competitive manufacturers.
NETL
NSTL
万方数据
