摘要
当下复杂的政治经济因素使得国内高端制造供应链存在中断风险.双源采购中断背景下,制造商和国内供应商如何通过有效的协调契约提升创新投入水平是发展高端制造供应链急需解决的问题.考虑了由国内外供应商、制造商组成的具有中断风险的双源采购模型,采用Stackelberg博弈方法研究了无协调契约、成本共担契约、价格补贴+成本共担契约对提升创新投入水平和期望利润的作用,并应用Mathematica分析了模型参数对最优结果的影响.结果表明:随着制造商对国内供应商的共担/补贴比例上升,国内供应商的创新投入和期望利润均有所增加;单独的成本共担契约不能有效地协调制造商和国内供应商;在一定的条件下,价格补贴+成本共担契约有效地协调了制造商和国内供应商,实现了帕累托改进.
Abstract
High-end manufacturing is an important object of the Made in China 2025 campaign and the 13th Five-Year Development Plan,and is one of the key points of the future development blueprint of Chi-na.The Chinese high-end equipment manufacturing industry is under the dual squeeze of"reshoring"by developed countries in the high-end sector and"substitution and diversion"by developing countries in the medium and low sectors.Only by vigorously advocating the high-end equipment manufacturing industry can we gradually master core key technologies and command industrial discourse power,and lead the overall development trend of the high-end equipment manufacturing industry.The current complex political and economic factors have given rise to the disruption of the domestic high-end manufacturing supply chain.In the context of dual-source procurement disruption,how to effectively reduce the impact of disruption on the high-end manufacturing supply chain through coordination contract,and how to better coordinate man-ufacturers and domestic suppliers to improve the level of innovation have become urgent issues to be solved in the development of the high-end manufacturing supply chain.By reviewing previous studies and in light of the current situation,we examined a dual-source procure-ment model with interruption risk for a supply chain consisting of domestic and foreign suppliers and manu-facturers.According to the model,all the agents aim to maximize their own expected profits,where the man-ufacturer,as the leader of the supply chain,preemptively decides the price,and the domestic and foreign sup-pliers,as followers,decide on their individual innovation input subsequently.Next,using the Stackelberg game method,we studied the role of no coordination contract,cost sharing contract,price subsidy+cost sharing contract in improving the level of innovation input and expected profit of the supply chain,and used Mathematica to analyze the impact of model parameters on the optimization results.The results showed that as the proportion of sharing/subsidization by the manufacturer to the domestic suppliers increases,the inno-vation input and expected profit of the domestic suppliers would somewhat increase;the cost sharing con-tract alone cannot effectively coordinate the manufacturer and the domestic suppliers;under certain condi-tions,the price subsidy+cost sharing contract could effectively coordinate the manufacturer and the domes-tic suppliers to achieve Pareto improvement;and through contract coordination,the domestic suppliers will increase innovation input and thus expand market demand,and the foreign suppliers will also be benefited from"free riding".This study only considered a two-echelon supply chain.In reality,the structure of a high-end manufac-turing supply chain is more complex.In the future,we hope to expand the scope to include to a three-eche-lon supply chain and further study the game model with two mutually competitive manufacturers.
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