Research on Coordination and Fairness of Agricultural Supply Chain Based on Bi-level Programming
With the rapid development of social economy,consumers'demand for agricultural products is increasing,and the requirement for freshness of agricultural products is getting higher and higher,which brings great challenges to the development of the agricultural supply chain.In order to promote the circula-tion of agricultural products and the development of the agricultural supply chain,the government has intro-duced a series of subsidy policies to actively promote the high-quality development of agricultural supply chain economy.With regard to the government's subsidy policy for agricultural products,we studied the coordination effi-ciency of the agricultural supply chain and the fairness of the government's subsidy allocation under the non-quota subsidy policy and the homogeneous subsidy policy respectively.Firstly,considering different interests and decision-making goals of each subject in the agricultural supply chain,we used the game theory to spe-cifically analyze the game behavior and choices of each subject in the agricultural supply chain under govern-ment subsidization.Secondly,in view of the complexity and hierarchy of the agricultural supply chain net-work,according to its structural characteristics,we designed the rules to convert the agricultural supply chain structure into a complex network for analysis.Then,based on the bi-level programming theory,we con-structed a model to minimize the unfairness of the allocation of government subsidies in the upper level and a network equilibrium model for the lower level agricultural supply chain respectively based on the Terrell index and the user equilibrium(UE)and system optimization(SO)theory.Finally,in order to validate the model and analyze the decision-making choices of each subject in the agricultural supply chain under gov-ernment subsidization,we designed a numerical example,conducted sensitivity analysis on the relevant pa-rameters,and mainly focused on how potential demand,price elasticity and cross-price elasticity of the agri-cultural market affected the fairness of allocation of government subsidies,the subsidy quota for supply chain enterprises,and the profits of these enterprises.The research results show that(1)under non-quota subsidization,the allocation of government subsidy is fairer and the profit of the agricultural supply chain is higher.(2)under non-quota subsidization,the subsidy quota of the supply chain enterprise is proportional inversely to price elasticity,and positively to cross-price elasticity and potential demand;when consumers are more sensitive to the price of agricultural products,the profit of the supply chain enterprises will be greater when market competition is more fierce;and within a certain range,cross-price elasticity is directly proportional to coefficient of unfairness.(3)With the homoge-neous subsidy strategy,the coefficient of fairness is proportional positively to the potential market demand,and the profits of the supply chain enterprises are proportional inversely to potential market demand and cross-price elasticity,and positively to price elasticity;and within a certain range,the coefficient of unfair-ness is proportional inversely to price elasticity,and positively to cross-price elasticity.In addition,according to the changes of the relevant parameters,we put forward corresponding sugges-tions and countermeasures for supply chain enterprises and government,providing theoretical basis for the decision-making,macroscopic readjustment,and control of the agricultural supply chain system.