首页|冷链物流高质量发展下政府与物流企业的演化博弈及仿真

冷链物流高质量发展下政府与物流企业的演化博弈及仿真

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冷链物流的高质量发展是《"十四五"冷链物流发展规划》中的重要内容.针对政府给予物流企业冷链补贴,并通过监管来促进冷链物流的高质量发展,建立政府与物流企业之间的演化博弈模型,探究其演化稳定策略,并运用Matlab对研究结果进行仿真模拟.研究表明:在不同约束条件下,政府与物流企业参与冷链物流高质量发展的行为博弈存在4种演化稳定策略,包括1个优稳定策略,1个局部优稳定策略,2个劣稳定策略.双方博弈受多方因素影响,政府的高效监管、适当的罚金制度,以及政企双方良好的参与意愿对系统具有积极影响,而政府监管成本和冷链物流成本对系统具有消极影响.另外,政府的冷链补贴虽然对演化稳定策略不产生直接影响,但在系统中却起到"催化剂"的作用,能有效刺激物流企业的参与意愿,然而过度的冷链补贴会滋养企业的搭便车行为,增加政府的资金压力,因此冷链补贴适度即可.
Evolutionary Game and Simulation between Government and Logistics Enterprises Based on High-quality Development of Cold Chain Logistics
High-quality development of cold chain logistics is an important element in the 14th Five-Year Plan for the cold chain logistics industry.The high-quality development of cold chain logistics is of great significance to reduce the loss of agricultural products and food products in circulation,expand the scope of high-quality market supply,promote farmer income increase and rural revitalization,and improve the quality and safety of fresh agricultural products.Despite the rapid development of cold chain logistics in China,there is still a big gap compared with developed countries.By establishing an evolutionary game model between the government and logistics enterprises,we ex-plored the evolutionary stable strategies of both parties in the high-quality development of cold chain logis-tics and carried out simulation with Matlab.The research result shows that under different constraints,there are four kinds of evolutionary stable strate-gies in the game between the government and logistics enterprises participating in the high-quality develop-ment of cold chain logistics,including one excellent stable strategy,one local excellent stable strategy and two inferior stable strategies.The game between the two parties is influenced by multiple factors,among which efficient government regulation,appropriate penalty system,and active participation of the govern-ment and enterprises have positive impact on the system,while cost of government regulation and cold chain logistics have negative impact on the system.In addition,although the government's subsidy on cold chain doesn't have a direct impact on the evolutionary stable strategies,it plays the role as a catalyst in the system,which can effectively stimulate the willingness of logistics enterprises to participate.However,excessive cold chain subsidization will encourage free-riding by the enterprises,and increase the government's financial stress,so cold chain subsidy should be best kept moderate.Based on the above research results,we put forward three suggestions.Firstly,the government and logis-tics enterprises should prioritize the excellent stable strategy and avoid the inferior stable strategy.Secondly,to achieve the excellent stable strategy,the government should reduce the cost of regulation,assist logistics enterprises to reduce the cost of the cold chain,and improve the efficiency of regulation.Finally,the govern-ment should provide cold chain subsidies moderately to stimulate the participation willingness of logistics en-terprises and prevent their free-riding behaviors.In this paper,we provided theoretical basis and practical guidance for understanding and promoting the high-quality development of cold chain logistics,which has important reference value for the government and logistics enterprises to make decisions in the field of cold chain logistics.

cold chain logisticshigh-quality developmentgovernment subsidylogistics enterpriseevo-lutionary game

秦智聃、弓宪文、李保东

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重庆第二师范学院 经济与工商管理学院,重庆 400067

冷链物流 高质量发展 政府补贴 物流企业 演化博弈

2024

物流技术
中国物流生产力促进中心 中国物资流通学会物流技术经济委员会 全国物资流通科技情报站 湖北物资流通技术研究所

物流技术

影响因子:0.506
ISSN:1005-152X
年,卷(期):2024.43(12)