首页|动力电池回收商与地方政府间行为策略演化博弈研究

动力电池回收商与地方政府间行为策略演化博弈研究

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新能源汽车的使用量急剧增长,对于到达使用寿命的电池若不及时回收拆解处理,便会造成环境的污染与公共资源的占用.基于此,文章构建动力电池回收商与地方政府之间的演化博弈模型,结合系统动力学理论,构建SD-演化博弈模型,借助Vensim仿真分析,验证均衡点的稳定性,探讨如何实现废旧动力电池高效回收.研究表明,动力电池回收商与地方政府之间存在长期博弈,只有在地方政府采取具有惩罚措施的动态监管策略时,系统才能达到均衡稳定状态,反之在静态监管策略下系统不稳定.
Evolutionary Game Research on Behavioral Strategies of Power Battery Recyclers and Local Governments
The use of new energy vehicles has increased rapidly,and if the batteries that have reached the service life are not recycled and disassembled in time,it will cause environmental pollution and the occupation of public resources.Based on this,an evolutionary game model between power battery recyclers and local governments is constructed,and an SD-evolutionary game model is constructed in combination with the system dynamics theory.The stability of equilibrium points is verified by Vensim simulation analysis,and how to achieve efficient recycling of used power batteries is discussed.The research shows that there is a long-term game between power battery recyclers and local governments,and only when local governments adopt a dynamic reg-ulatory strategy with punitive measures,the system can reach an equilibrium and stable state.Conversely,the system is unstable under a static regulatory strategy.

power battery recyclingreward and punishment strategyevolutionary game theorysystem dynamics simulation

赵丹、薛婉婷、崔晓冰、郑芳悦

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安徽工业大学管理科学与工程学院,安徽马鞍山 243032

动力电池回收 奖惩策略 演化博弈论 系统动力学仿真

2025

物流科技
全国物流科技情报信息中心 中国仓储协会

物流科技

影响因子:0.489
ISSN:1002-3100
年,卷(期):2025.48(1)