物流科技2025,Vol.48Issue(1) :101-106.DOI:10.13714/j.cnki.1002-3100.2025.01.021

基于三方演化博弈的出租车驾驶人交通违法行为分析

Analysis of Traffic Violating Behavior of Taxi Drivers under the Tripartite Evolutionary Game

林欣蓉 孙久镔 孙晨飞 汤天培
物流科技2025,Vol.48Issue(1) :101-106.DOI:10.13714/j.cnki.1002-3100.2025.01.021

基于三方演化博弈的出租车驾驶人交通违法行为分析

Analysis of Traffic Violating Behavior of Taxi Drivers under the Tripartite Evolutionary Game

林欣蓉 1孙久镔 1孙晨飞 2汤天培1
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作者信息

  • 1. 南通大学交通与土木工程学院,江苏南通 226019
  • 2. 昆明空港投资开发集团有限公司,云南 昆明 650200
  • 折叠

摘要

为了从执法部门和出租车公司两方探索对出租车驾驶人交通违法行为的管理措施,有必要研究执法部门、出租车公司对出租车驾驶人交通违法行为的影响机制.基于演化博弈论,从交通违法和管理的成本收益角度,构建了出租车驾驶人与执法部门、出租车公司的策略选择演化三方博弈模型.通过模型求解和仿真分析,揭示了不同管理策略下交通违法成本对出租车驾驶人交通违法行为的影响机理.研究结果表明:当执法部门和出租车公司共同管理出租车驾驶人交通违法行为时,能将驾驶人交通违法概率控制在相对最低的水平,且管理投入相对也最低;出租车公司的管理力度对一般状态驾驶人的交通违法行为影响更大,而执法部门的执法力度对临界状态驾驶人的交通违法行为影响更大;相较于现金处罚,驾照分扣减和驾驶资格限制对出租车驾驶人交通违法行为的管理更有效.

Abstract

In order to explore the management measures for the traffic violating behavior of taxi drivers from the two sides of law enforcement departments and taxi companies,it is neces-sary to study the influence mechanism of law enforcement de-partments and taxi companies on the traffic violating behavior of taxi drivers.Based on evolutionary game theory,from the perspective of cost and benefit of traffic violating behavior and management,this paper proposes a tripartite evolutionary game model of strategy choice among taxi drivers,law enforcement departments and taxi companies.Through model solving and simulation analysis,this study revealed the influence mecha-nism of traffic violating cost on taxi drivers'violating behavior under different management strategies.The results show that when the law enforcement departments and taxi companies jointly manage the traffic violating behavior of taxi drivers,the probability of traffic violating behavior can be controlled to a relatively low level,and the management cost is also relatively low.The management of taxi companies has a greater impact on the traffic violating behavior of taxi drivers in general state,while the enforcement of law enforcement departments has a stronger effect on the traffic violating behavior of taxi drivers in critical state.Compared with cash penalty,driving license deduction and disqualification are more effective in managing taxi drivers'violating behavior.

关键词

交通安全/交通违法行为/演化博弈模型/出租车驾驶人

Key words

traffic safety/traffic violating behavior/evolution-ary game model/taxi driver

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出版年

2025
物流科技
全国物流科技情报信息中心 中国仓储协会

物流科技

影响因子:0.489
ISSN:1002-3100
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