Analysis of Traffic Violating Behavior of Taxi Drivers under the Tripartite Evolutionary Game
In order to explore the management measures for the traffic violating behavior of taxi drivers from the two sides of law enforcement departments and taxi companies,it is neces-sary to study the influence mechanism of law enforcement de-partments and taxi companies on the traffic violating behavior of taxi drivers.Based on evolutionary game theory,from the perspective of cost and benefit of traffic violating behavior and management,this paper proposes a tripartite evolutionary game model of strategy choice among taxi drivers,law enforcement departments and taxi companies.Through model solving and simulation analysis,this study revealed the influence mecha-nism of traffic violating cost on taxi drivers'violating behavior under different management strategies.The results show that when the law enforcement departments and taxi companies jointly manage the traffic violating behavior of taxi drivers,the probability of traffic violating behavior can be controlled to a relatively low level,and the management cost is also relatively low.The management of taxi companies has a greater impact on the traffic violating behavior of taxi drivers in general state,while the enforcement of law enforcement departments has a stronger effect on the traffic violating behavior of taxi drivers in critical state.Compared with cash penalty,driving license deduction and disqualification are more effective in managing taxi drivers'violating behavior.
traffic safetytraffic violating behaviorevolution-ary game modeltaxi driver
万方数据
维普
