The Dynamic Strategy for Low-carbon Supply Chain Considering Government Subsidies and Disappointment Aversion
In the context of consumers with low-carbon preferences and government subsidies,this study constructs a differential game model about manufacturers and retailers.In the construction of the model,the effects of disappointment aversion and gov-ernment subsidies on decision-making are considered.The following conclusions are obtained:(1)Disappointment aversion re-duces the emission reduction efforts of manufacturers,but does not affect the level of low-carbon promotion of competitive retail-ers.Emission reduction,goodwill,and profit are all negatively related to the level of disappointment aversion;(2)The level of competition among retailers has a dampening effect on their profits;(3)Consumer low-carbon preference further promotes manu-facturers'abatement behavior,bringing about an increase in emission reductions.
万方数据
维普
