基于双边垄断模型的动车组列车最高限价策略研究
Research on the ceiling price strategy of the EMU trains based on bilateral monopoly model
郭利田 1王鹏 2李红利 3李悦 1宋晔1
作者信息
- 1. 中国铁道科学研究院集团有限公司运输经济研究所,北京 100081
- 2. 中国国家铁路集团有限公司运输局,北京 100844
- 3. 中国国家铁路集团有限公司物资部,北京 100844
- 折叠
摘要
合理确定动车组列车及其高级修服务采购最高限价是铁路企业降低采购成本、提高采购效率的重要方式,也是推动动车组供需双方在动车组研制、维修方面深化合作的重要举措.文章基于动车组列车采购规模大且需求稳定、制造成本测算难、全寿命周期维修费用高、供应商数量少的技术经济属性,构建双边垄断市场结构下动车组列车采购价格模型,分析动车组列车整车及高级修服务的价格决定机制.研究结果表明,动车组列车整车和高级修服务采购价格不存在纳什均衡,国铁集团和中国中车在动车组研制、维修等多领域开展战略合作,符合双方的长远利益.
Abstract
Reasonably determining the ceiling price for the procurement of rolling stock trains and their advanced repair services is an important way for railroad enterprises to reduce procurement costs and improve procurement efficiency,and it is also an important measure to promote the deepening of cooperation between the supply and demand of rolling stock in the development and maintenance of rolling stock.Based on the technical and economic attributes of EMU trains such as large scale and stable demand of procurement,difficult to measure manufacturing cost,high life cycle maintenance cost and small number of suppliers,this article establishes a model of procurement price for EMU trains under bilateral monopoly market structure,and analyzes the price determination mechanism of whole unit of EMU trains and advanced repair service.The results of the study show that there is no Nash equilibrium in the procurement price of whole unit of EMU trains and advanced repair services,and that it is in the long-term interests of both parties for CRRC and the State Railway Group to carry out strategic cooperation in various fields such as the research,development and maintenance of EMU.
关键词
动车组列车/双边垄断/高级维修/最高限价Key words
EMU trains/bilateral monopoly/advanced maintenance/ceiling price引用本文复制引用
基金项目
中国国家铁路集团有限公司科技研究开发计划(2023F022)
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据