Analysis of Tripartite Evolutionary Game of Green Technology Innovation in Manufacturing Enterprises
Manufacturing enterprises are important organisations for economic development,intermediate links in the flow of goods,and important drivers for promoting the development of green low-carbon and green energy-saving technologies in the national economy.Adopting the evolutionary game model,the research hypotheses are oriented to the actual scenarios of green technological innovation under the actual environmental regulation,and the three objects of the policy promoter,implementer and receiver are selected to construct a non-cooperative evolutionary game model of the synergistic effect of the government and the manufacturing enterprises on the green technological innovation,and to analyse the local government's implementation of the positive green technological innovation support as well as the negative green technological innovation support under the central government's environmental protection and green innovation strategy.The game analysis of the green technology innovation penalty to promote the external incentive mechanism of green technology innovation of manufacturing enterprises and the ideal evolutionary stable equilibrium,and the simulation of the combination of environmental and green technology innovation initiatives to promote the green technology innovation policy of enterprises under the initial willingness of each.
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